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Abstract 
This paper examines how the underinvestment that results from the hold-up problem is affected 
when there is some probability of reaching a free trade agreement (FTA). This paper examines the 
canonical domestic hold-up problem in an international context. It considers an input supplier 
undertaking one-sided cost-reducing relationship-specific investment to produce an input for a 
final-good producer. Once the FTA is reached, both the final-good producer and input supplier 
face foreign competition. This study finds that it is possible for the presence of FTA negotiations 
to either aggravate or alleviate the domestic hold-up problem. The total effect of the presence of 
FTA negotiations on ex-ante investment incentives can be decomposed into an “output 
competitive effect” and an “input substitution effect”. Both effects can be further decomposed into 
a “strategic effect” and a “cost effect”. The fundamental driving forces behind the “strategic effect” 
and “cost effect” are the characteristics of the cost function for the non-standardised input, the 
characteristics of the final-good’s demand function, and the relative efficiency of the two 
final-good producers in the two countries. In addition, the probability of reaching the FTA serves 
as an “intensifier” of the aggravation or alleviation. The modification cost of the foreign input 
serves as a “protector” for the domestic non-standardised input against competition from the 
cheaper foreign substitutes.
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1. Introduction 
The trend of trade liberalization has significantly boosted world trade in the past 
five decades. According to conventional trade theory, this trade boom has been led by 
falling trade barriers. However, the increasing rate of trade volume has been higher 
than the decreasing rate of trade barriers. Therefore, conventional trade theory is not 
able to explain this rise (Feenstra, 1998). A new trade phenomenon in the last few 
decades is the significant rise in foreign outsourcing and foreign direct investment 
(FDI). Since both usually involve trade in intermediate inputs, both might be 
additional driving forces behind the trade boom (Feenstra, 1998). Since inputs 
production is explained by theories of the firm, but not by conventional trade theories, 
researchers began to explore this new trade phenomenon by combining these two 
literatures. This combination of theories is hoped to shed light on the causes of recent 
world trade boom(Ornelas and Turner, 2008). 
This paper is motivated by this new literature. The goal of this paper is to 
demonstrate that in the presence of free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations, how the 
probability of opening up to free trade affects the ex-ante investment incentives in a 
standard domestic hold-up situation
1
. The objective is unlike most papers in this 
literature, which focus on the optimal choices of organizational forms under free 
trade. Here, choice of organizational forms does play an important role, but it is not 
the main focus of this paper. 
                                                             
1 As opposed to international hold-up problem where the final-good producer and the specialized input supplier are 
located in different countries. 
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A real-world phenomenon motivates this paper in particular. FTA has been 
popular since 1990s as the total number signed worldwide has dramatically increased 
from around 30 to approximately 400 (World Trade Organization, 2010). However, 
FTA negotiations normally take a long time and FTAs may not be reached eventually. 
For example, Australia-China FTA Negotiations started in 2005 but are still ongoing. 
The time-consuming nature is not only because of the bargaining complexity, but also 
because of unforeseen changes in political and economic relationships between 
countries. Hence, FTA negotiations create uncertainty for an investor who is about to 
undertake relation-specific investments (RSI) in a domestic hold-up situation. To my 
knowledge, no existing literature investigates the domestic hold-up problem (domestic 
HUP) under this uncertainty arising from FTA negotiations.  
As an illustrative example, consider a final-good producer and a fully-specialised 
input supplier in Australia. There is an Australian-China FTA negotiations going on 
when the supplier chooses RSI. Once the FTA is reached, the Australian final-good 
producer engages in quantity competition with its Chinese counterpart. Furthermore, 
the Australian input supplier faces fierce competition from the cheaper Chinese inputs 
priced competitively. Is it still rational for the Australian input supplier to undertake 
RSI? If so, how different the investment level would be relative to that in the absence 
of FTA negotiations? This article is aimed at giving some answers to these questions. 
The setting is as follows. There are two countries, Home and Foreign. Home has a 
monopoly final-good producer using one standardised input and one non-standardized 
input to produce one final good. The non-standardized input is supplied by a 
 5 
 
monopoly supplier through a cost-reducing RSI.
2
 RSI is observed by both firms but 
not enforceable by the court. Thus RSI is non-contractible ex-ante, when its nature is 
not revealed yet. The terms-of-trade is determined through Nash-bargaining ex-post. 
Foreign is identical in every respect except two aspects. Firstly, prices for the 
homogeneous standardised inputs in the two countries may not be equal. Secondly, 
both of the foreign producer’s inputs are standardized one with no RSI required. This 
foreign standardized input and the domestic non-standardized input are partial 
substitutes since both final-good producers need to incur specific modification costs 
to the input supplied aboard for them to become perfect substitutes.  
The bilateral FTA is reached with a probability that is common knowledge among 
all parties in both countries. If the FTA is reached, the final-good industry structure 
shifts from two monopolies in the two countries to Cournot duopoly in an integrated 
market. In addition, since the input market also open, both producers can access to 
cheaper foreign inputs. For simplicity, the foreign input is assumed to be sufficiently 
cheap so that the foreign final-good producer never buys the domestic 
non-standardized input under free trade. i.e., only the domestic final-good producer, 
not the domestic supplier, is possible to have positive outside option under FTA 
negotiations.  
This paper firstly shows the existence of the domestic HUP under autarky. 
Secondly, it investigates how partial FTA negotiations (free trade only in the 
final-good market) affect investments under autarky. This effect is denoted as the 
                                                             
2 A domestic bilateral monopoly is assumed so that outside options are normalized to zero for both domestic firms 
under autarky. This simplification allows clear focus on how FTA negotiations affect their outside options. 
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“output competitive effect”. Thirdly, it explores the additional change in investments 
under FTA negotiations (free trade in both the final-good and input markets) relative 
to partial FTA negotiations. This effect is denoted as the “input substitution effect”. 
The total effect of FTA negotiations on investments is a combination of the two 
effects. The main finding of this study is that it is possible for the presence of FTA 
negotiations to either aggravate or alleviate the domestic HUP. Both effects can be 
further decomposed into a “strategic effect” and a “cost effect”. The “strategic effect” 
arises from the change in the impact of additional investment on the final-good total 
revenue through the investment’s direct effect on the final-good’s Cournot equilibrium 
price. The “cost effect” comes from the change in the impact of additional investment 
on the final-good total cost through changes in final-good output. There are three 
fundamental driving forces behind the “strategic effect” and “cost effect”: (1) the 
characteristics of the cost function for the non-standardised input; (2) the 
characteristics of the final-good’s demand function; (3) the relative efficiency of the 
two final-good producers in the two countries. In addition, the probability of reaching 
the FTA serves as an “intensifier” of the aggravation or alleviation. While the 
modification cost of the foreign input serves as a “protector” against competition from 
the cheaper foreign substitute. As expected, low modification cost alone may not 
result in low investment, as the investment also depends on other parameters. For 
example, if the probability of reaching the FTA is considerably low and the domestic 
final-good producer is more efficient than its foreign counterpart, then the investment 
may actually increase. 
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This paper is the first one to address the impact of FTA negotiations (expected free 
trade) on the domestic HUP. It contributes to the hold-up literature as it indentifies the 
presence of FTA negotiations as a new channel through which the HUP can be 
alleviated. It also contributes to the international trade literature by further identifying 
the implications of free trade on productive efficiencies, and thus welfare. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Field overview 
Since this research studies the domestic HUP in the international context, two 
areas of research are relevant: theories of the firm and international trade theories.  
There are four major firm boundary theories: Transaction-cost economics (TCE), 
property-rights theory, incentive systems, and delegation of authority (Spencer, 2005). 
HUP is firstly studied by transaction-cost economics informally, and later modelled 
by property-rights theory formally. As mentioned in Introduction, conventional trade 
theories are no longer sufficient to explain the rapid growth in intermediate goods 
trade; researchers began to combine trade theories with the theories of the firm, in 
particular, TCE and PRT (Spencer, 2005). This chapter firstly reviews TCE and PRT. 
Secondly, it reviews the new literature. Lastly, it evaluates the most relevant articles to 
this study, and indentifies the gap to be explored in this research.  
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2.2. Two relevant branches of the theories of the firm 
2.2.1. Transaction-cost economics 
TCE is set out by Coase (1937). Prior to Coase (1937), researchers only focused 
on the market mechanism and paid little attention to transactions within firm 
boundaries. Coase (1937) holds that firms exist because it is more efficient to 
undertake some transactions within firms rather than in the market if the internal 
transaction costs are lower than external transaction costs. Internal transaction costs 
mainly arise from management and coordination costs associated with higher 
bureaucracy. External transaction costs come from searching and matching suitable 
transacting parties as well as negotiating, writing and enforcing contracts. Nonetheless, 
a firm cannot do all the transactions inside because of the rising internal transaction 
costs. Furthermore, undertaking some transactions in the market is more efficient than 
within firms. Therefore, firms choose organization forms to minimize total transaction 
costs. 
Modern TCE is mainly developed by Williamson (1971, 1975, 1979) and Klein et 
al. (1978) and others. TCE focuses on relationship-specific investments (RSI) in 
specific asset which has higher value within the relationship than its value from the 
next best alternative use outside the relationship. This gap between first-best and 
second-best payoffs gives rise to positive quasi-rent as firstly noted by Klein et al. 
(1978). The nature of the asset is not revealed until the investment is sunk. Since in a 
world of uncertainty, it is almost impossible for a contract to specify all possible 
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contingencies, and it is extremely costly to write a complex contract, contracts are 
normally incomplete. The quasi-rent created by RSI for the investing parties are 
subject to potential appropriation of the non-investing party through ex-post 
renegotiation. The fear of not getting full marginal benefit from investment leads the 
investing party to underinvests, which is well-known as the hold-up problem (HUP). 
The larger the quasi-rent is, the higher a party’s incentive to behave opportunistically 
and hold up the other (Klein et al., 1978). Williamson (1975) firstly adds this ex-post 
opportunistic behavior in the form of renegotiation as a new type of transaction costs 
to those identified in Coase (1937). TCE proposes that vertical integration can 
alleviate the HUP. However, the “make-or-buy” decision depends on the assessment 
between the costs of integration and the costs of underinvestment.  
 
2.2.2. Modern property-rights theory 
Seminal papers in modern property-rights theory (PRT) were by Grossman and 
Hart (1986) and Hart andMoore (1990). PRT has the same antecedent as TCE, namely 
Coase (1937). It also concerns the inefficiency arising from the underinvestment when 
specific assets create quasi-rents and contracts are incomplete (Whinston, 2003). PRT 
predicts that ownership of assets gives a firm the residual rights of control over assets. 
This improves its bargaining position ex-post. Ownership should be allocated to the 
party who is most important in generating the joint surplus. In this way, the relatively 
important firm has increased incentives to undertake RSI, however, at the expense of 
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reduced incentives for the other firm. If firms are equally important, then they should 
be separate. Thus, boundaries of firms are determined to minimise the deadweight 
loss due to the HUP (Grossman and Hart, 1986, Hart and Moore, 1990).  
 
2.2.3. Transaction-cost economics vs. Modern property- 
rights theory 
PRT is distinct from TCE in several ways. Firstly, TCE is relatively informal but 
PRT provides formal modeling. Secondly, TCE emphasizes ex-post opportunistic 
behavior, while PRT emphasizes ex-ante investment incentives, which can be altered 
by allocating rights of control over the asset ex-ante. Thirdly, while TCE holds that 
vertical integration minimises the HUP, it does not explain why the distortion in 
investment incentives is corrected within firms. By contrast, PRT proposes that the 
HUP exists under any governance structure, including vertical integration. So it is a 
matter of choosing an optimal governance structure which has the least severe HUP. 
Unlike TCE’s prediction, vertical integration may aggravate the HUP, for example, 
when both parties are important in generating joint surplus (Grossman and Hart, 1986, 
Hart and Moore, 1990, Whinston, 2003). Fourthly, TCE has been widely supported by 
rich empirical works. In contrast, too little empirical testing is done for PRT mainly 
due to the fragility of its predictions (Lafontaine and Slade, 2007, Whinston, 2003).  
The recent literature in the theories of the firm begins incorporating ex-post 
inefficiency (Matouschek, 2004, Kvaløy, 2007, Hart and Moore, 2008, Hart, 2009). 
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For example, Hart and Moore (2008) argues that contracts are still not perfectly 
contractible ex-post because the short-changed party may shade on “consummate 
performance” that is not contactable ex-post. This new research direction is beyond 
the scope of this paper, which still solely focuses on ex-ante inefficiency.  
 
2.3. Combination of theories of firms and trade theory 
There are two main branches of the new trade literature which combine 
international trade theory with TCE and PRT respectively. In the literature that 
combine trade theory with TCE (e.g. McLaren (2000) , Grossman and Helpman (2002, 
2005)), vertical integration alleviates the HUP at a fixed cost. These papers all hold 
that organization forms are also affected by the market thickness. Thicker market 
reduces searching-and-matching costs and makes international outsourcing more 
attractive than FDI (international vertical integration).  
Antràs (2003, 2005a, 2005b) , and Antràs and Helpman (2004) embed PRT into 
general equilibrium monopolistic competitive models of trade. Antràs (2003) finds 
that FDI is more likely for capital-intensive input production that involving greater 
RSI; foreign outsourcing is more likely for labour-intensive input production. In 
Antràs and Helpman (2004), organization forms and production destinations are 
driven by the productivity of final-good producers.  
This study takes TCE approach
3
, rather than PRT approach since it takes into 
account future extension of this model to the international HUP. PRT has weakness in 
                                                             
3 This paper assumes that vertical integration eliminates HUP with fixed cost, just for technical simplicity.  
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application to the international HUP, as it assumes residual rights of control can be 
fully enforced by the Court ex-post (Demsetz, 1998). However, contract enforcement 
is more lenient across national boarder (Ornelas and Turner, 2007). Furthermore, 
these two branches both concentrate on firms’ “make-or-buy” or “Home-or-Foreign” 
decisions. But this study focuses on the domestic HUP.  
 
2.4. The gap to explore 
The following discusses four most relevant articles to this work. 
Ornelas and Turner (2009) explores the effects of the input-tariff on the HUP, 
organization choice and welfare. One of its main findings is most relevant to this 
work. It indentifies the welfare-enhancing effect of the input-tariff through attenuation 
of the domestic HUP, in a similar but distinct setting relative to this study. In their 
paper, Home is a small economy. Under free trade, the domestic final-good producer 
takes the world competitive price for the final good as given. One unit of final good 
needs one unit of input. The producer undertakes “dual sourcing” and buys both a 
standardized input from foreign competitive market and a non-standardized input 
(involving RSI) from Home or Foreign. The standardized and non-standardized 
inputs are perfect substitutes. If it buys the non-standardized input domestically, the 
domestic HUP exists; if it buys it from Foreign, the international HUP exists. It 
identifies that an exogenously given input-tariff can alleviate the domestic HUP 
because a higher input-tariff may worsen the domestic final-good producer’s outside 
 13 
 
option of buying the foreign standardized input. Thus the domestic specialized 
supplier’s bargaining position can be improved and investment incentives can rise. In 
contrast, if it buys the non-standardized input from Foreign, the input-tariff does not 
alleviate the international HUP as the same input-tariff is imposed on both the foreign 
standardized and non-standardized inputs. So the input-tariff does nothing in favor of 
the foreign specialized supplier. 
   The similarities between their findings and this study lie in the focus on the impact 
of exogenously given trade policy on the HUP. In addition, their finding of the 
alleviation of the domestic HUP due to trade policy is also one of the key results in 
this work, which studies the domestic HUP. 
Nonetheless, similar results are driven by different forces due to different settings. 
In this study, the integrated final-good market is Cournot-duopoly, rather than perfect 
competition. Thus, unlike their paper where the final-good price under free trade is 
given exogenously and unaffected by investment, investment has an extra “strategic 
effect” on final-good price under free trade in this study. In addition, they only focus 
on the effect of trade policy on the input market rather than the final-good market. 
While in this work, the FTA affects both input and final-good markets. Therefore, the 
“cost-effect” driven by the relative efficiency of domestic and foreign final-good 
producers does not exist in their paper. In fact, the input-tariff resembles the 
modification cost of the foreign input in this work since both affect the outside option 
of the domestic final-good producer. 
Unlike Ornelas and Turner (2009) and this paper, in Antràs and Staiger (2010), 
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trade policy is endogenously chosen. They assume that all final-good producers are in 
Home, and all specialized suppliers are in Foreign. They demonstrate the existence of 
optimal FTA which completely solves the international HUP. The optimal FTA 
should provide free trade in final-goods market and appropriate trade subsidies to 
encourage input trade volume. Then the foreign input supplier’s ex-post bargaining 
positions and investment incentives improve.  
To my knowledge, Antràs and Staiger (2010) is the only article that also models 
the relationship between the HUP and the FTA. However, this work assumes that 
FTA’s design is exogenous, i.e., completely opening up the final-good and input 
markets. Then it examines how a potential FTA affects the domestic HUP. In contrast, 
Antràs and Staiger (2010) endogenize the design of FTA, and studies how the 
international HUP affects the optimal FTA design. 
Wes (2000) is interested in the domestic HUP when the economy shifts from 
autarky to partial free trade only in the final-good market, which has the same focus 
as the “partial FTA negotiations model” from this work. It also adopts a partial 
equilibrium approach and considers two identical countries, each with a bilateral 
monopoly of a final-good producer and a specialised input supplier who undertakes 
one-sided cost-reducing RSI. It assumes that the domestic and foreign final-good 
producers engage in Bertrand competition under partial free trade. It concludes that 
partial free trade in final good has a “knock-on” effect on the input market and 
alleviates the domestic HUP. The driving force is similar to the positive “cost effect” 
in this study. Bertrand output is higher under partial free trade than monopoly output 
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under autarky. The investment is more valuable as it reduces costs across larger 
final-good output. Nonetheless, they have no “strategic effect” identified in this study. 
This is because final-good price under Bertrand competition (unlike Cournot duopoly 
in this work) is not affected by investment. Furthermore, Wes (2000) only explicitly 
compares the privately-optimal investment under partial free trade relative to the 
socially-optimal investment under autarky
4
, rather than to the privately-optimal 
investment under autarky as in this work. 
The general setting in this study mostly resembles that in Spencer and Qiu (2001). 
Spencer and Qiu (2001) is distinct from all papers mentioned above as it applies 
theories to explain a real-world trade phenomenon. When Japan and US shift from 
partial free trade (only in automobile) to free trade (also opens up auto-parts market), 
A representative Japanese car maker (domestic final-good producer) starts having two 
input procurement options: switching to buy the standardised input from US 
competitive market or remain buying non-standardised input from Keiretsu (domestic 
specialised input supplier). The setting is broader than that in this study as the car 
maker has a continuum of inputs, each produced by a specialised Keiretsu supplier 
undertaking cost-reducing RSI. There exists a domestic HUP between the car maker 
and each Keiretsu supplier. The fundamental difference of this paper from their paper 
is that while this paper concentrates on the domestic HUP, they only concentrate on 
the range and volume of Japanese import of US auto-parts, in explaining the US 
perception of trade barrier.  
                                                             
4 Neither the domestic HUP nor the allocative inefficiencies of monopoly exists.  
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In sum, the originality of this paper is that it is the first one to address the impact 
of FTA negotiations (expected free trade) on the domestic HUP. It incorporates the 
probability of opening up free trade, which is not done by any paper above. It 
contributes to the hold-up literature as it indentifies a new channel of alleviating the 
HUP, i.e. the presence of FTA negotiations. It also contributes to the international 
trade literature by further indentifying the implications of free trade on productive 
efficiencies, and thus welfare, although welfare discussion is beyond the scope of this 
paper.  
 
3. Closed-economy model 
There are two countries, Home and Foreign. Initially, there is no free trade 
between these two countries.  
 
3.1. Home country 
The home country has a final-good producer producing good 1. It needs two 
inputs, one is standardised, called input S ， with price SP . The other is 
non-standardized, called input N, with price NP . The final-good producer has a 
Leontief production function  
    1 S N S NQ f Q ,  Q min Q ,  Q   
1Q is the final-good output and S NQ ,  Q  are the quantities of the input S and N 
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respectively. The production function indicates that to produce one unit of good 1, at 
least one unit of input S and one unit of input N are required. To minimize production 
cost, one unit of each input is used to produce one unit of good 1. Therefore,
1 N sQ Q Q  . The demand function for the final good is 1 1 1Q Q (P ) , so the quantity 
demanded only depends on the price for good 1, and is independent of other variables, 
such as consumers’ income and taste (Spencer and Qiu, 2001, Wes, 2000).  
The producer buys input S from a domestic competitive market, so S SP C , where 
SC is the constant marginal cost of producing input S. However, it buys input N from 
a domestic supplier who undertakes a cost-reducing RSI to produce the 
non-standardized input N. RSI is the investment in specific asset which is valued 
higher within a trading relationship than outside the relationship. The quasi-rent
5
 of 
the investor created by the specific asset is the primal value of the asset within the 
trading relationship (first-best option) over its salvage value outside the relationship 
(second-best option) to the investor, after the RSI is sunk (Klein et al., 1978). In this 
closed-economy model, it is assumed that there are no outside options for both firms, 
so the salvage value of the input supplier’s asset equals zero. Consequently, the 
quasi-rent of the input supplier equals to the asset’s primal value within the trading 
relationship
6
. 
The domestic input supplier holds a monopoly in the non-standardized input N as 
it owns the specific technology required to produce it. Input N is produced with a 
                                                             
5 Quasi-rent in this paper refers to the quasi-rent of the individual firm who invests in the specific asset (Klein et al., 
1978, Besanko, 2010).  In some articles, quasi-rent refers to the ex-post joint surplus (Koss and Eaton, 1997, Antràs 
and Helpman, 2004) . Another example is that Spencer and Qiu (2001) uses “rent” which refers to “relational 
quasi-rent”. See its footnote 6 on page 872. 
6 See further discussion below in footnote 17.   
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marginal cost NC (k) plus a fixed cost k (0,K] , which are the units of the RSI. K is 
the highest investment level given the resources constraint of the input supplier. This 
specific investment is assumed to be one-shot, that is, the two firms only trade once. k 
is observed by both firms, but it is not enforceable by the court. So k is not 
contractible ex-ante, when its nature is not revealed yet. The marginal cost of input N 
is assumed to be 
 N NC (k)=c c (k) , 
where c is the initial marginal cost with no RSI undertaken. k reduces NC (k) from the 
initial marginal cost c at a decreasing rate by the amount Nc (k) : 
(1) 
Ndc (k)
0
dk
 ,
2
N
2
d c (k)
0
dk

 
Therefore, 
(2)  
NdC (k)
0
dk
 ,
2
N
2
d C (k)
0
dk
 . 
Thus, NC (k) is a twice differentiable, strictly convex and decreasing function of k.  
3.1.1. Non-vertically integrated solution 
This model involves two stages: stage 1 and stage 2. In stage 1, supplier of input 
N strategically chooses the RSI level, k, taking into account the effect of k on NP  
and 1Q  in stage 2. k is sunk immediately after it is made. k is non-contractible and 
no contract is signed in this stage. In stage 2, given k committed, NP  and 1Q are 
determined simultaneously.
7
 The two firms engage in Nash cooperative bargaining 
                                                             
7 There are three alternative orders of moves. [1] Two stage game: in Stage 1, k and 1Q  are simultaneously 
determined; in Stage 2, NP is determined. [1] is suitable if design changes to the input for compatibility 
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(Nash, 1953) over NP  to maximize the surplus from agreement which is expressed as 
a function of 1Q . The final-good producer chooses 1Q  to maximize its payoff, which 
is expressed as a function of NP . NP  and 1Q  are derived by solving these two 
equations simultaneously.  
As usual, the problem is solved backwards. 
 
3.1.1.1. Stage 2: bargaining over input price and output decision  
After k is sunk, NC (k) is committed. The two firms engage in Nash cooperative 
bargaining over NP , which is expressed as a function of 1Q .  and1 are the 
bargaining powers of the final-good producer and the input supplier respectively. It is 
assumed that  0,1 . 1 is the condition for the input supplier to invest, 
otherwise, its profit is negative as it cannot recover the investment cost (Spencer and 
Qiu, 2001). Assuming 0  is because once the specific k is committed, the input 
supplier is vulnerable to no trade threat (Williamson, 1975), which gives the 
final-good producer positive bargaining power. This paper further assumes that 
neither firm has any outside option. In addition, this ex-post Nash bargaining is 
efficient as there is no informational asymmetry, i.e., all the relevant variables are 
                                                                                                                                                                              
improvement with other inputs. Then, it is critical to know the exact production requirement when making 
relationship-specific investment (Spencer and Qiu, 2001) But in this case, it is not necessary to know the exact 
production requirement when making relationship-specific investment, so the original order of moves is more 
natural. [2] Three stage games: in stage 1, k is determined; in stage 2, NP is determined; in stage 3, 1Q  is 
determined. [3] Three stage games: in stage 1, k is determined; in stage 2, 1Q is determined; in stage 3, NP  is 
determined. [2] and [3] give the same result as the order of moves in the main text. This is because both NP and 1Q  
are chosen at the levels that maximise the surplus from agreement. See (3) and (7). 
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common knowledge for both firms(Wes, 2000). NP satisfies  
(3) 
     
   
N
1
N 1 1 S N 1 N N 1
P
1
1 1 S N N N 1
P arg max P (Q ) P P Q 0 P C (k) Q 0
P (Q ) P P P C (k) Q
 
 
     
   
 , 
where  1 1 S N 1P (Q ) P P Q  and  N N 1P C (k) Q  are the respective ex-post payoffs 
from bargaining for the final-good producer and the input supplier.  
It is assumed that    
1
1 1 S N N N 1P (Q ) P P P C (k) Q
 
    is concave in NP  and 
twice differentiable. 
First-order condition (FOC) for (3): 
       
1 1
1 1 s N N N 1 1 1 S N N N 1P (Q ) P P P C (k) Q (1 ) P (Q ) P P P C (k) Q 0
   
         
Second-order condition (SOC) for (3): 
2 1
1 1 1 S N N N 1 1 S N(1 )Q [P (Q ) P P ] [P C (k)] [P (Q ) P C (k)] 0          
The above FOC and SOC guarantee that the FOC solves for a unique maximizer 
(4)  N 1 N 1 1 S NP (Q ,k) C (k) (1 ) P (Q ) P C (k)     8. 
Denote 1 as the final-good producer’s ex-ante and ex-post payoff. 9 Simultaneously, 
given k, the final-good producer chooses 1Q to solve for 
(5) 
1Q
1 1 1 S N 1
max
[P (Q ) P P ]Q   
 
subject to (4) N N 1 1 S NP (k) C (k) (1 )[P (Q ) P C (k)]     . 
Substituting the constraint (4) into (5) yields 
                                                             
8 See A.1 in Appendix for derivation. 
9 Ex ante payoff is equivalent to rent or economics profit, which is the excess payoff to a factor of production over 
the minimum amount of payoff needed to remain it in its current use (Bird and Tarascio, 1992). So they are used 
interchangeably thereafter. 
 Ex post payoff does not include the ex ante investment cost as the ex ante payoff does. So ex post payoff equals ex 
ante payoff plus the ex ante investment cost. Since the final-good producer does not invest ex ante, its ex ante and 
ex post payoff are equal. 
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(6) 
1Q
1 1 1 S N 1
max
[P (Q ) P C (k)]Q      
It is assumed that 1  is strictly concave in 1Q  and twice differentiable.  
FOC for (6): 
(7)  
1
1 1 1 1 1 S N
1
d
P '(Q )Q P (Q ) P C (k) 0
dQ

       
SOC for (6): 
(8) 
 2 1 1 1 1 1 S N1
1 1 1 1 1
2
1 1
d P '(Q )Q P (Q ) P Cd
P ''(Q )Q 2P '(Q ) 0
dQ dQ
  
     
The above FOC and SOC guarantee that the FOC solves for a unique maximiser, i.e. 
the optimal output
1
Q (k) . 
Adopting implicit function theorem on (7) yields
10
: 
N
1
1 1 1 1 1
C '(k)
Q '(k)
P ''(Q (k))Q (k) 2P '(Q (k))


. 
According to (2) and (8),  
(9) 1Q '(k) 0 , 
which indicates that the optimal output 1Q (k) increases in k. The intuition is that when 
k rises, the marginal cost of the final-good producer falls. Since the final-good 
producer holds a monopoly, it always chooses the optimal output that equates its 
marginal revenue to marginal cost to maximise its profit. As marginal cost falls, 
marginal revenue must fall. Since marginal revenue decreases in output, the optimal 
                                                             
10
 Firstly, express 1Q  in (7) in terms of k and rewrite (7) as 
   1 1 1 1 1 S NP ' Q (k) Q (k) P Q (k) P C (k) 0    . Secondly, differentiate the above equation with respect to k: 
     1 1 1 1 1 1 1 NP '' Q1(k) Q '(k)Q (k) P ' Q1(k) Q '(k) P ' Q1(k) Q '(k) C '(k) 0    . 
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output level rises consequently.  
Substituting the optimal output 1Q (k) into (4) gives 
(10)  N N 1 1 S NP (k) C (k) (1 ) P Q (k) P C (k)       . 
Given 1Q (k) and NP (k) , the respective optimal ex-post payoffs11 for the final-good 
producer and the input supplier are  1 1 s N 1P Q (k) P P (k) Q (k)    and 
  N N 1P (k) C (k) Q (k) . These two ex-post payoffs sum up to the optimal total value 
achievable by the asset for the two firms if and only if the agreement is reached:    
 1 1 s N 1P Q (k) P C (k) Q (k)     
Define R(k) as the optimal surplus
12
 from agreement between the two firms 
under autarky. It equals the total value of the asset subtracted by each firm’s outside 
options under autarky:
 
(11) 
   
 
1 N 1 1 s N 1
1 1 s N 1
R(k) R Q (k),C (k) P Q (k) P C (k) Q (k) 0 0
P Q (k) P C (k) Q (k)
       
    
 
This surplus gets divided between the two firms in the proportion of :1 by 
NP (k) , which is bargained over. They agree to trade in stage 2 if and only if the 
surplus is nonnegative. This is because firstly we assume that the two firms are both 
risk neutral (Grossman and Hart, 1986); secondly, under Nash bargaining, each firm 
gets a payoff which equals to its outside option plus the bargaining share of the 
surplus. If the surplus is negative, each firm simply chooses its outside option (Nash, 
1953).  
 
                                                             
11 For simplicity, the word “optimal” may be omitted thereafter when referring to an “optimal” value, once it is 
clearly defined as an “optimal” value. 
12 The surplus from agreement is assumed not to diminish during Nash bargaining (Koss and Eaton, 1997).  
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Proposition 1. (i)The surplus between the domestic final-good producer and the 
input supplier under autarky is increasing in k: R'(k)>0 . (ii)The marginal benefit 
from investment for the domestic input supplier is increasing in the domestic 
final-good producer’s output: 
(1- α)R'(k)
> 0
Q(k)
∂
∂
 . 
 
Proof. Rearranging (7) gives    1 1 S N 1 1 1P Q (k) P C (k) P ' Q (k) Q (k)    .                                            
Using the above equation, totally differentiate R(k) with respect to k, 
(12) 
   
   
1 1 1 N 1 1 1 S N 1
1 1 1 N 1 1 1 1 1
N 1
R '(k) P ' Q (k) Q '(k) C '(k) Q (k) P Q (k) P C (k) Q '(k)
P ' Q (k) Q '(k) C '(k) Q (k) P ' Q (k) Q (k)Q '(k)
C '(k)Q (k) 0
          
    
  
 
Partially differentiate (1 )R '(k) with respect to 1Q (k) , 
 
N
1
(1 )R '(k)
(1 )C '(k) 0
Q (k)
 
   

 
Q.E.D.
 
The value of additional unit of k comes from its ability of reducing the marginal 
cost of input N by N NC '(k) c '(k) 0   across all the optimal output 1Q (k) . Ceteris 
Paribus, the surplus between the two domestic firms increases. When output rises, 
additional unit of k is more valuable since it can reduce cost across larger output. 
 
 Example for Proposition 1(i) 
The demand function for good 1 in Home: 1 1Q a bP    
The marginal cost function of the non-standardised input N: NC (k) kc    
The surplus between the two domestic firms under autarky is calculated to be 
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2
S(a+ b( c+ k) bR )
4b
(
P
k
) 
 . 
The derivative of the surplus with respect to k is calculated to be 
Sa+ b( c+R'(k)
k) bP
4 k
 
  
Parameters of relevant variables: 
a =100  
b =1 
c = 50  
SP = 10  
Using these parameters, if k 0 , the derivative of the surplus with respect to k is 
calculated to be positive,
40
4
k) 0R'(


k
k
. 
 
3.1.1.2. Stage 1: Relationship-specific investment 
Denote N as the input supplier’s ex-ante payoff under autarky. By further solving 
backwards, in stage 1, the input supplier strategically chooses the optimal investment 
that solves for 
(13)  N N N 1
k
max
P (k) C (k) Q (k) k (1 )R(k) k      
 
13
 
It is assumed that N is increasing and strictly concave in k , twice differentiable and 
                                                             
13 
 
   
  
N N 1
N 1 1 S N N 1
1 1 S N 1
P (k) C (k) Q (k) k
C (k) (1 ) P Q (k) P C (k) C (k) Q (k) k
(1 ) P Q (k) P C (k) Q (k) k
(1 )R(k) k
 
       
     
   
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has a unique interior maximiser
 
 Ak 0,K (Che and Hausch, 1999). The subscript A 
denotes autarky. 
FOC for (13): 
(14) 
Nd
(1 )R '(k) 1 0
dk

     
Denote AMB  as the marginal benefit from investment for the input supplier under 
autarky. Denote MC  as the marginal cost from investment, which equals to one  
(15)                            
AMB (k) (1 )R '(k),
MC 1
 

 
SOC for (13): 
(16)                            
2
N
2
d
(1 )R ''(k) 0
dk

    
Since (1 ) 0  , (16) is equivalent to assuming that  
(17) R ''(k) 0  
The above FOC and SOC guarantee that the FOC solves for a unique interior 
maximiser Ak , which satisfies (14), 
(18) 
A(1 )R '(k ) 1  , 
The input supplier chooses Ak at which A AMB (k ) MC 1  to maximise profit. 
The necessary and sufficient condition for the input supplier to choose Ak 0 is 
A A A
N(k ) (1 )R(k ) k 0     . Positive profit implies that the surplus is sufficiently 
large, such that 1  of it is still large enough to recoup the investment cost
Ak . 
Rearrangement yields that the surplus must be positive if Ak 0 : 
(19) 
A
A kR(k ) 0.
1
 

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3.1.1.3. Summary 
In stage 2, given Ak 0 committed in stage 1, 
1
AQ (k )  and ANP (k )  are 
determined. From (19), 
AR(k ) 0 , so agreement is always reached between the two 
firms. The final-good producer orders input N, and the input supplier starts producing 
A
1Q (k ) units of input N, and charges price
A
NP (k ) . The final-good producer’s ex-ante 
payoff is 
                AR(k )                                   if 
AR(k ) 0  
(20) 1   
0                                       if AR(k ) 0  
If the investment generates non-negative surplus, the final-good producer can obtain a 
non-negative payoff, which is fraction of the surplus, otherwise, it gets zero.  
The input supplier’s ex-ante payoff is 
(21)  
A A(1 )R(k ) k                                if 
AR(k ) 0  
N   
Ak                                          if 
AR(k ) 0                                             
If the investment generates non-negative surplus, the input supplier obtains a 
non-negative ex-ante payoff, which is1 fraction of the surplus. Otherwise, since 
the asset has zero salvage value, all the investment cost cannot be recovered. 
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3.1.2. Vertically integrated solution as a benchmark 
This model assumes that if the two firms vertically integrate, the hold-up 
problem
14
 is completely eliminated, but at a fixed integration cost IC (Hart and 
Tirole, 1990, McLaren, 2000, Ornelas and Turner, 2008) .
15
 The vertically integrated 
solution requires both output
 
and the investment are at the efficient levels that 
maximise the profit of the vertically integrated firm: 
(22) 
1
I I
S N1 1 1
k,Q
max
P (Q ) P C (k) Q k C          
It is assumed that 
I  is increasing, jointly strictly concave and twice differentiable 
in 1Q  and k . 
FOCs for (22): 
(23) 
I
1 1 S N1 1 1
1
P '(Q )Q P (Q ) P C (k) 0
Q

    

  
(24) 
I
N 1C '(k)Q 1 0
k

   

  
SOCs for (22): 
2 I
1 1 1 1 1
2
1
P ''(Q )Q 2P '(Q ) 0
Q
 
  

 
2 I
N 1
2
C ''(k)Q 0
k
 
  

 
2
2 I 2 I 2 I
2 2
1 1
0
Q k kQ
      
  
   
 
                                                             
14 See Section 3.1.3 for detailed discussion. 
15 
I
C may due to lower managerial incentive(Crémer, 1995, Williamson, 1971) or fewer opportunities to diversify 
risk(Hanson, 1995) etc. The assumption of complete elimination of hold-up here is just for technical simplicity. 
Vertical integration cannot eliminate but may attenuate hold-up problem (Grossman and Hart, 1986, Hart and Moore, 
1990). 
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The above conditions guarantee that the FOCs are sufficient for solving for a pair of 
maximiser  I I1Q ,k . 
There are two steps to derive  I I1Q ,k . 
Step1. Solve (23) and (24) together to get the optimal investment under vertical 
integration
Ik  which satisfies: 
(25) 
1
I I
NC '(k )Q (k ) 1   
Since from (12),
1
NR'(k) C '(k)Q (k)  , (25) is equivalent to  
(26) 
IR '(k ) 1  
Step2. Substitute 
Ik into (23) or (24) to get the optimal output under vertical 
integration
1
IQ (k ) . 
Substitute 
Ik into (22) yields the optimal profit of the integrated firm 
(27)   I I I I I I I I1 S N1 1(k ) P Q (k ) P C (k ) Q (k ) k C R(k ) k C            
The profit of the integrated firm is the total value created by 
Ik  subtracted by the 
investment and fixed integration costs. The second equality is due to two reasons. 
Firstly, (23) or (24) give the same output function expressed in k as (6). So the total 
values created by an investment under vertical and non-vertical integration are equal 
(reducing cost across the same output). Secondly, the total value under non-vertical 
integration also equals the surplus under autarky since neither firm has outside option.  
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3.1.3. Non-vertically integrated solution vs. vertically 
integrated solution 
Comparing (18) and (26), when 0  , they are the same.16 When the final-good 
producer has no bargaining power, the input supplier can receive all the marginal 
benefit from its investment, it chooses the efficient level
Ik , so there is no HUP.  
 
Proposition 2. (i) Under autarky, if the final-good producer’s bargaining power
 
 0,1 , N  and 
I  are increasing, twice differentiable, strictly concave in k , 
and have 
Ak  and 
Ik  as unique interior maximisers respectively, then
A Ik k . (ii) 
Ceteris Paribus, the magnitude of this underinvestment increases in . 
 
Proof. 
(i) Since  0,1 , from (18) and (26), we have 
(28) 
A I1R '(k ) 1 R '(k )
1
  

 
From (17) on page 25, R ''(k) 0 ,  
A Ik k .  
(ii) Since
A IR '(k ) R '(k ) 0
1

  

, 
A IR '(k ) R '(k )
0
    

, 
A Ik k
0
 


. 
                                                             
16 Although 0  is ruled by assumption, it is worth mentioning this case here. 
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Ceteris Paribus, the magnitude of this underinvestment increases in .                                 
Q.E.D. 
 
 Example for Proposition 2 
This example uses the same demand and cost functions and parameters as in the 
previous example and additional parameters: the domestic final-good producer’s 
bargaining power 
0.5  ,  
The fixed cost of vertical integration  
IC 300  
17
 
the investment under non-vertical integration is calculated to be 
Ak 32.65 and the 
investment under vertical integration is calculated as 
I 17 8k 7.7 . Thus, there is 
underinvestment under non-vertical integration relative to vertical integration under 
autarky, 
A I 145. 3k 1k 0    . 
Then, Figure 1 is plotted to show we how   affects the difference in investments 
in Figure 1. The horizontal axis measures , and the vertical axis measures k. Ik is 
independent of   since there is no ex-post bargaining under vertical integration. Ak
is decreasing in  . As   rises, the domestic input supplier receives smaller share of 
the benefit from investment, so it invests less. For  0,1 , A Ik k . As rises, the 
magnitude of the underinvestment rises. 
                                                             
17 
I
C  is chosen to be large, since this model assumes that the vertical integration does not occur under autarky as 
integration costs outweigh integration benefits. 
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Figure 1  
 
This underinvestment under non-vertical integration is known as the hold-up 
problem. The existence of positive quasi-rent of the investing party creates hold-up 
potentials. In this model, since the asset has zero salvage value, the quasi-rent of the 
input supplier is the asset’s primal value to the supplier within the relationship:
 N N 1P (k) C (k) Q . 18  As long as N NP (k)>C (k) , the final-good producer may 
attempt to lower the input price NP (k) and appropriate this quasi-rent (Klein et al., 
1978). Its ability to appropriate depends on its bargaining power  . Under 
non-vertical integration, foreseeing this potential hold-up, the input supplier 
strategically chooses Ak  by taking into account its inability in getting the full AMB
since  fraction of it is appropriated by the final-good producer. Lower marginal 
                                                             
18 In this model, the input supplier’s quasi-rent equals to its ex post payoff. To show this equality, suppose that the 
supplier has a positive second-best outside option (k) . The surplus is
       1 1 s N 1 1 1 s N 1R k, (k) P Q (k) P C (k) Q (k) (k) 0 P Q (k) P C (k) Q (k) (k)           The 
supplier’s quasi-rent is the extra payoff from its first-best option over its second-best option: 
 (1 )R k, (k) (k)     ; its ex post payoff from bargaining is   (k) (1 ) R k, (k) (k)       . Since
(k) 0  in this model, its quasi-rent and ex post payoff are equal.  
It is also notable that, Ceteris Paribus, both its quasi-rent and ex post payoff are decreasing in  since 
 
  
 
(1 )R k, (k) (k)
R k, (k) 0
     
   

and
   
  
(k) (1 ) R k, (k) (k)
R k, (k) (k) 0
       
     

. Higher   enables the final-good 
producer appropriates more quasi-rent, so the supplier gets less ex post payoff. 
k I
k A
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
50
100
150
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benefit from investment distorts the input supplier’s investment incentive and 
generates the hold-up problem (Klein et al., 1978, Williamson, 1979). Ceteris Paribas, 
the magnitude of this further underinvestment I Ak k  increases in   (Besanko, 
2010). If   rises, the domestic input supplier gets even lower AMB , so it further 
underinvests. 
 
3.2. Foreign country  
The similar structure exists in Foreign. Foreign also has a final-good producer also 
producing homogeneous output, good 1. Production of good 1 requires two inputs. 
One is the homogenous standardised input S which is also used in home country, 
with price
*
SP . Foreign is identical in every respect to Home except two aspects. One 
is that the prices for input S in the two countries, 
*
SP  and SP , may not equal. The 
other is that another input needed by the foreign final-good producer is a standardized 
one with no RSI required, called input *S , with price *
*
S
P . It has a Leontief production 
function 
    * * *1 S SS SQ f Q ,  Q min Q ,  Q 
19
                   
*
1
Q is the foreign output of good 1; 
S
Q  and *SQ are the quantities of input S  and 
*S respectively. To produce one unit of good 1, at least one unit of input S and one 
unit of input *S  are required. To minimize production cost, one unit of each input is 
used to produce one unit of good 1. Foreign has the same market size and demand 
                                                             
19 Good 1 produced in Home and Foreign are assumed to be homogeneous for convenience, as in Spencer and Qiu 
(2001). It is possible for a final good to be homogeneous even though they are produced with different inputs. For 
example, if the input is human capital, then it is possible for different human capital to make homogenous product. 
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function as that of Home. Denote foreign demand function as * * *
1 1 1
Q Q (P ) . The 
foreign final-good producer buys both input S and input *S from foreign competitive 
markets, so
* *
S S
P C , * ** *S SP C , where 
*
S
C  and 
*
*S
C are the constant foreign marginal 
cost of producing input S and *S respectively. It chooses *
1
Q to maximise its payoff 
*
1
  
(29) 
* * * * * *
*1 1 1 S 1S*
1Q
max
P (Q ) P P Q       
FOC for (29): 
(30) 
* * * * * * *
*1 1 1 1 1 S S
P '(Q )Q P (Q ) P P 0     
The optimal output *
1
Q satisfies (30). Substitute 
*
1
Q into (29) yields the optimal 
payoff for the foreign final-good producer 
(31) 
* * * * * *
*1 1 1 S 1S
P (Q ) P P Q      . 
 
To summarize Chapter 3, under autarky, the domestic final-good producer buys 
both standardized and non-standardized inputs domestically. It produces good 1 and 
holds a monopoly domestically. (20) and (21) give the payoffs of the domestic 
final-good producer and domestic input supplier of N respectively. The foreign 
final-good producer buys both standardized inputs from the foreign competitive 
markets. It produces good 1 and holds a monopoly in Foreign, getting a payoff given 
by (31). 
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4. Partial free trade agreement negotiations 
model 
This model involves three stages: stage 1, stage 2 and stage 3. 
In stage 1, the domestic input supplier strategically chooses k units of RSI. 
In stage 2, a bilateral partial FTA is reached with a probability  0,1 .20 This partial 
FTA aims at only opening up the final-good market to free trade.  is exogenously 
determined and it is common knowledge among all parties in both countries, such as 
firms and governments.  
In stage 3, if FTA is not reached, the remaining game between the two domestic firms 
is the same as stage 2 under autarky in Section 3.1.1.1 on page 19. 
If the partial FTA is reached, trade opens for good 1, but the input market is still 
closed. Transportation cost is assumed to be zero. There are no further renegotiations 
or reneging by any government. The two final-good producers  sell the homogenous 
good 1 in an integrated market and compete in quantities, so the standard Cournot 
model applies (Tirole, 1988). The total market demand for good 1 is the horizontal 
summation of the two countries’ demands 
 PT * PT
1 1 1 1
Q (P ) Q (P ) . 
The subscript PT denotes partial free trade; PT
1
P is the price for good 1 under partial 
free trade; PT
1 1
Q (P )and * PT
1 1
Q (P ) are the Cournot equilibrium outputs of the domestic 
and foreign final-good producers respectively at PT
1
P .  
                                                             
20 0  is ruled out since there is no need for the two countries to negotiate a FTA if there is no possibility of 
reaching it. 
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In stage3, PT
N
P ,
1
Q and *
1
Q are determined simultaneously by solving a system of 
three equations simultaneously. Here, PT
N
P  is the price for input N under partial free 
trade.  
Again, the model is solved backwards. 
 
4.1. Stage 3: Bargaining over input price and output 
decisions 
As mentioned, if the partial FTA is not reached in stage 2, the game remains the 
same as stage 2 under autarky. 
If the partial FTA is reached in stage 2, the domestic final-good producer and the 
domestic input supplier engage in Nash bargaining over
N
P , taking 
1
Q and *
1
Q  as 
given.  
After k is sunk, NC (k) is committed. The two domestic firms engage in Nash 
bargaining over PT
N
P  which satisfies: 
(32)      PT PT * PT PTN 1 1 S N N
N
1
1 1 N 1
P
P argmax P (Q Q ) P P Q 0 P C (k) Q 0
 
       , 
where PT PT
1 S N
*
1 11P (Q Q ) P P Q      and  
PT
N
N 1P C (k) Q  are the respective ex-post 
payoff from bargaining under partial free trade for the domestic final-good producer 
and the domestic input supplier. Both domestic firms still have zero outside options, 
as the input market is still closed.  
FOC for (32) yields 
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(33) PT PT PT
N N 1 S
* *
1 N 1 N1 1P P (k,Q ,Q ) C (k) (1 ) P (Q Q ) P C (k)          .
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The domestic final-good producer chooses 1Q to solve for 
(34) PT PT PT
1 1 S N
*
1 11
1
max
P (Q Q ) P P Q
Q
        
subject to (33) PT PT
N 1 S
*
N 1 N1P C (k) (1 ) P (Q Q ) P C (k)        .  
Substitute (33) into (34) : 
(35)  PT PT *1 1 1 S1 N 1
1
max
P (Q Q ) P C (k) Q
Q
     
 
The foreign final-good producer chooses *
1
Q to solves for  
(36) 
*PT PT * * * *
*1 1 1 S 1* S
1
1
max
P (Q Q ) P P Q
Q
        
The Cournot FOCs for (35) and (36): 
(37) 
PT PT *
PT *1 1 1
1 1 S
*PT PT *
* PT * * *1 1 1
*1 1 1 S S* *
1 1
1
1 1 N
1 1
1
1
P (Q Q )
Q P (Q Q ) P C (k) 0,
Q Q
P (Q Q )
Q P (Q Q ) P P 0
Q Q
  
     
 
  
     
 
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The above conditions guarantee that the FOCs solve for a unique Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium outputs  PT * * *PT * ** *1 S S 1 S SS SQ (k,P ,P ,P ),Q (k,P ,P ,P ) .  
Define
PTR (k) as the optimal surplus from agreement under partial free trade 
between the two firms. It equals to the total value of the asset subtracted by each 
firm’s outside options under partial free trade:
 
 
(38) 
 
 
PT PT *PT PT
1 1 1 1
PT PT
1 S 1
PT
N
R (k) P Q ( ) Q ( ) Q ( ) 0 0
P ( ) P C (k) Q ( )
        
    
 
 
                                                             
21 The derivation is analogous to that of (4), as shown in A.1 in Appendix.  
22 Note that the domestic final-good producer chooses the output that maximises both its own payoff and the joint 
surplus under partial free trade, because its payoff is proportional to the latter. Thus, when competing with its foreign 
counterpart, it is as if its own marginal cost is
S
NP C (k) . 
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Proposition 3. The surplus PTR(k) under partial free trade is increasing in k.  
 
Proof. See A.2 in Appendix.  
 
From (80) in the proof,  
(39) PT *PT PT PT
1 1 1 1
PT
NR '(k) P '( )Q '(k)Q (k) ( C '(k))Q (k) 0      
Under partial free trade, additional unit of investment not only reduces the cost of 
input N across the domestic final-good producer’s equilibrium output, but also 
increases the equilibrium price through decreasing the foreign final-good producer’s 
equilibrium output. The two effects both increase the surplus under partial free trade. 
In sum, the ex-ante payoffs of domestic and foreign final-good producers as well 
as the domestic input supplier under partial free trade are 
  PT PT PT1 1 S 1
PT
NP ( ) P C (k) Q (k) R (k)         
*PT PT * * *PT
*1 1 S 1S
P ( ) P P Q (k)        
 PT PT PTN N N 1
PTP (k) C (k) Q (k) (1 )R (k) k      .
 
 
4.2. Stage 2: Partial FTA reached or not reached 
The partial FTA is reached with probability (0,1] . No decision making is required 
for any firms. 
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4.3. Stage 1: Relationship-specific investment 
The domestic input supplier chooses investment under partial FTA negotiations to 
maximise its expected profit  
(40) PT PT
N N
N
k
max
E (k) (k) (1 ) (k)        
The subscript E  denotes the expected value;  is the probability of reaching the 
partial FTA; 
PT
N
(k)  is the domestic input supplier’s partial-trade profit if the partial 
FTA is reached given an investment k; N(k) is its autarky profit, given the same 
investment.  
For  0,1 , it solves for 
(41)  
PT PT
N N
N
k
PT
PT
max
E (k) (k) (1 ) (k)
(1 )R (k) k (1 ) (1 )R(k) k
(1 )R(k) (1 ) R (k) R(k) k
      
            
          
 
FOC for (41): 
(42) 
PT
N PTdE (1 )R '(k) (1 ) R '(k) R '(k) 1 0
dk

          . 
Denote 
PTEMB as the expected marginal benefit from investment under the partial 
FTA negotiations  
(43) 
PT PT
PT
EMB (k) (1 )R '(k) (1 )(1 )R '(k)
(1 )R '(k) (1 ) R '(k) R '(k)
      
       
. 
SOC for (41): 
(44) 
PT
N
2
PT
2
d E
R ''(k) R ''(k) R ''(k) 0
dk

        
From (17), R ''(k) 0 , for (44) to hold for any  0,1 , we need PTR ''(k) 0 . 
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Thus, (44) is equivalent in assuming 
(45) 
PTR ''(k) 0 . 
The above conditions ensure that the FOC solves for a unique maximiser, which is 
assumed to be interior:  PTk 0,K . PTk  satisfies (42): 
(46) PT PTEMB (k ) 1  , 
At PTk , PT
N
E is maximised. 
Substitute 
PTk into (41) to get the optimal PT
N
w which is assumed to be nonnegative: 
(47) 
PT
N
PTE (k ) 0  . 
 
4.3.1. Investment under autarky vs. investment under 
partial FTA negotiations 
 
Proposition 4.  
(i) The hold-up problem that results in underinvestment is alleviated under Partial 
FTA negotiations in two cases: (ii.1) the partial-trade output is above the autarky 
output PT
1 1
A AQ (k ) Q (k ) ; (ii.2) the partial-trade output is less than the autarky output
 
1 1
PT A AQ ( k ) Q ( k )  and *
1 1 1 1 1
'( ) '( ) ( ) '( ) ( ) ( )   PT PT PT PTA A A A ANP Q k Q k C k Q k Q k . 
(ii) The hold-up problem that results in underinvestment is aggravated under partial 
FTA negotiations if the partial-trade output is less than the autarky output 
1 1
( ) ( )PT A AQ k Q k and *
1 1 1 1 1
'( ) '( ) ( ) '( ) ( ) ( )   PT PT PT PTA A A A ANP Q k Q k C k Q k Q k .  
(iii) Ceteris paribus, the magnitudes of aggravation in (i) and alleviation in (ii) both 
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increase in the probability of reaching the partial FTA,θ . 
 
Proof. See A.3 in Appendix. 
 
Denote the total effect of opening up the final-good market on the optimal 
investment under autarky Ak as the “output competitive effect”. To examine this 
“output competitive effect”, the key is to analyse the difference in the marginal benefit 
from investment under partial free trade from that under autarky, given Ak : 
(48) 
 PT *PT PT PT1 1 1 1 1
PT A A
A A A A A
N
(1 )R '(k ) (1 )R '(k )
(1 )P '( )Q '(k )Q (k ) (1 ) C '(k ) Q (k ) Q (k )
  
        
.
23
 
If PT A AR '(k ) R '(k ) , 
Ak  is more valuable once the partial FTA is reached. Thus, 
the domestic input supplier invests more when there is probability of reaching the 
partial FTA. Analogously, if PT A AR '(k ) R '(k ) , it invests less relative to
Ak . 
The direct effect of opening up the final-good market on the marginal benefit from 
investment under autarky as given by (48) can be decomposed into two effects: a 
“strategic effect” and a “cost effect”.  
The “strategic effect” is represented by the first term 
 PT *PT PT
1 1 1
A A(1 )P '( )Q '(k )Q (k )  . 
Since this term is always positive, the “strategic effect” always puts upward pressure 
on 
Ak . This is because additional unit of investment at Ak reduces the domestic 
final-good producer’s marginal cost. Thus, it has a direct positive effect on the 
Cournot equilibrium price through reducing the foreign final-good producer’s 
                                                             
23 (48) is derived from (12)  and (80). 
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partial-trade output. Higher equilibrium price raises revenue across partial-trade 
output of the domestic final-good producer, so the investment is more valuable. 
The “cost effect” is given by the second term 
   PT1 1A A AN(1 ) C '(k ) Q (k ) Q (k )      
This “cost effect” on Ak may be positive or negative depending on the difference 
between the partial-trade output and the autarky output, given Ak . The absolute value 
of the second term,  
  PT1 1A A AN(1 ) C '(k ) Q (k ) Q (k )    
indicates the strength of the “cost effect”. The “cost effect” on Ak  is positive if 
PT
1 1
A AQ (k ) Q (k )  since investment is more valuable by reducing costs across larger 
partial-trade output. The “cost effect” is negative if PT
1 1
A AQ (k ) Q (k ) , since 
investment is less valuable by reducing costs across smaller partial-trade output. 
From (48), the total effect of opening up the final-good market on Ak is a 
combination of the “strategic effect” and the “cost effect”. If PT
1 1
A AQ (k ) Q (k ) , the 
two effects work in the same direction, and both put upward pressures on Ak . If 
PT
1 1
A AQ (k ) Q (k ) , the two effects work in the opposite directions. Although the 
“strategic effect” has upward pressure, the “cost effect” puts downward pressure on
Ak . So the total effect depends on which effect dominates. The following three cases 
discuss these situations. 
Case 1. 
If PT
1 1
A AQ (k ) Q (k ) , both the “strategic effect” and “cost effect” put upward pressures 
on Ak , so the investment under partial free trade is higher relative to autarky. 
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Consequently, if there is probability of opening up final-good market, there exists a 
chance to have higher marginal benefit from investment relative to autarky. Thus, 
PT A A AEMB (k ) MB (k ) , the domestic input supplier invests more under partial FTA 
negotiations relative to autarky, 
PT Ak k . 
Case 2.  
If PT
1 1
A AQ (k ) Q (k ) , and the positive “strategic effect” is stronger than the negative 
“cost effect”, i.e., PT *PT PT PT
1 1 1 1 1
A A A A A
NP '( )Q '(k )Q (k ) C '(k ) Q (k ) Q (k )    , then the total 
effect puts upward pressure on Ak . Following the same argument above, the domestic 
input supplier invests more under partial FTA negotiations relative to autarky, 
PT Ak k .
 
Case 3.  
If PT
1 1
A AQ (k ) Q (k ) , and the negative “cost effect” is stronger than positive 
“strategic effect”, i.e., PT *PT PT PT
1 1 1 1 1
A A A A A
NP '( )Q '(k )Q (k ) C '(k ) Q (k ) Q (k )    , then the 
total effect puts downward pressure on Ak . The domestic input supplier invests less 
under partial FTA negotiations relative to autarky, 
PT Ak k . 
The probability of reaching the partial FTA   serves as an “intensifier” of the 
difference between PT AEMB (k )  and A AMB (k ) , which is represented by 
PT A A(1 ) R '(k ) R '(k )      . Thus, as in case 1 and case 2 when 
PT Ak k , if the 
probability rises, the domestic input supplier has higher chance of getting higher 
marginal benefit from investment, so it invests even higher PTk relative to Ak . Hold-up 
problem is further alleviated. However, in case 3 when 
PT Ak k , if the probability 
rises, the domestic input supplier has higher chance of getting lower marginal benefit 
from investment, so it invests even lower relative to Ak . The hold-up problem is further 
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aggravated. 
 Example for Proposition 4 
This example uses the same functions and parameters as in previous examples, and 
the following additional parameters: 
the price for foreign input S 
SP 8 ; 
the price for foreign input *S  
*
*
S
P 15 ; 
and the probability of reaching the partial FTA 
= 0.5 . 
The following results are calculated. 
The investment under partial FTA negotiations 
PT 1 9k 5.6
 
There is underinvestment under partial FTA negotiations relative to autarky 
PT Ak 096k 16.  
 
The partial-trade output is less than the autarky output 
PT
1 1
A AQ (k ) Q (k 13.2) 4 0  
 
The negative “cost effect” outweighs the positive “strategic effect” 
PT *PT PT PT
1 1 1 1 1
A A A A A
N0.28P '( )Q '(k )Q (k ) = C '(k ) Q (k ) - Q (k 1. 4) 4     
This example has the same conditions as in case 3, as predicted by Proposition 4 (ii), 
the investment under partial FTA negotiations is less than the investment under 
autarky 
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PT Ak k  . 
Figure 2 is plotted to show the relationship between the probability of reaching the 
partial FTA,  , and the magnitude of the underinvestment PT Ak k . The horizontal 
axis measures  , and the vertical axis measures k. Figure 2 illustrates that Ak is 
independent of  . Since under autarky, it is certain to get A AMB (1 )R(k )  . Under 
partial FTA negotiations, as  rises, it is more likely to get RT A(1 )R (k )  which is 
less than AMB , so PT AE MB (k ) falls and less investment is chosen. Thus, the 
magnitude of the underinvestment PT Ak k increases, which verifies Proposition 4 
(iii). 
 
Figure 2 
 
It is notable that the results of Proposition 1 are based on whether the partial-free 
output PT
1
AQ (k )  exceeds the autarky output
1
AQ (k ) or not, given Ak . In fact, there are 
two well-known driving forces behind this. One is that the total equilibrium outputs 
are larger that the summation of monopoly outputs, since the markets are more 
competitive under Cournot competition relative to monopoly (Church and Ware, 
1999). Since the two markets are of equal size, even if they are equally efficient, each 
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final-good producer produces higher output under Cournot competition relative to its 
monopoly output under autarky. The other is that the Cournot equilibrium output of a 
producer is increasing in its relative efficiency to its counterpart (Church and Ware, 
1999). Whether the output under partial free trade is higher than the output under 
autarky is ambiguous since it depends on both driving forces discussed above. 
 
To sum up Chapter 4, there is less underinvestment under partial FTA negotiations 
in two scenarios. One is when the domestic final-good producer’s equilibrium output 
is higher than its autarky output, given the optimal investment under autarky 
unchanged. The other is when the former output is less than the latter, but the strategic 
effect outweighs the cost effect. There is further underinvestment under partial FTA 
negotiations when the former output is less than the latter, but the cost effect 
outweighs the strategic effect. 
 
5. Free trade agreement negotiations model 
The setting of this model is similar to that of the partial FTA negotiations model, 
except that once the partial FTA is reached, not only the final-good market, but the 
input market is also open. This model also involves three stages: stage 1, stage 2 and 
stage 3. 
In stage 1, the domestic input supplier strategically chooses k units of RSI. 
In stage 2, a bilateral FTA is reached with a probability  0,1 ,  is exogenously 
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determined. 
In stage 3, if FTA is not reached, the remaining game between the two domestic 
firms is the same as stage 2 under autarky in Section 3.1.1.1 on page 19. 
If the FTA is reached, trade opens in both the final-good market and input market. 
Thus the integrated world market demand function for good 1 is 
 T * T
1 1 1 1
Q (P ) Q (P )  
where T
1
P is the price for the final-good under free trade, with the subscript T 
denoting the free trade; T
1 1
Q (P )and * T
1 1
Q (P ) are the Cournot equilibrium outputs of the 
domestic and foreign countries respectively at T
1
P .  
Because input S produced domestically is a perfect substitute for input S produced 
overseas, and the markets of input S are perfectly competitive in both countries, both 
the domestic and foreign final-good producers buy input S at the competitive price 
from the market with lower marginal cost: 
(49) T *
S S S
,P min{P P }  
However, input N and  are heterogeneous. The domestic final-good producer 
needs to incur a per-unit modification cost (0, )   in terms of quantity of input *S , 
to turn input *S into a perfect substitute for input N. That is, one unit of input N is to be 
equivalent to 1  of input *S . It has a production function 
(50)     *S1 S N S N S
Q
Q f Q ,  Q   min Q ,  Q  min Q ,  
1
 
      
 
Analogously, the foreign final-good producer incurs a per-unit modification cost 
* (0, )    in terms of quantity of input N to make N a perfect substitute for *S . It has 
a production function 
*S
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 * *1 S
N
S S *
Q
Q  min Q ,  Q  min Q ,  
1
 
   
  
  
To focus on the domestic market, the following assumption is made for simplicity. 
 
ASSUMPTION 1. The lowest marginal cost of input N possible given the 
investment constraint of the domestic input supplier is still higher than the marginal 
cost of input *S  in Foreign : 
*
*N S
C (K)> C . 
 
This assumption simplifies the model by removing the possibility that the foreign 
final-good producer has the option to buy from the domestic input supplier.  
Denote T
N
min P  as the lowest price for input N under FTA negotiations. 
Under this assumption, we have
T T * *
* *N N N S S
*min P (1 ) min P C (K) C P      because: 
i. 
T T
N N
*min P (1 ) min P   since * 0   
ii. 
T
N N
min P C (K)  is because: the domestic input supplier’s ex-ante profit is
 TN N 1P (k) C (k) Q k  , thus positive profit implies that
T
N N
P (k) C (k) . Since
 N NC (k) C (K), k 0,K   , we get  
T
N N N
P (k) C (k) C (K), k 0,K     which 
implies that any price for input N (including the minimum price) exceeds the 
lowest marginal cost of input N. Otherwise, the ex-ante profit is negative since 
the ex-ante investment cost is not recoverable for certain.  
iii. In Foreign, the input *S is produced competitively, so
* *
* *S S
C P . 
Under this assumption, because the lowest price for “modified” input N is still higher 
than that for input
*S , the foreign final-good producer never switches to buy input N 
once the FTA is reached. 
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In stage3,
N
P ,
1
Q and *
1
Q are determined simultaneously by solving a system of three 
equations simultaneously.  
Again, the model is solved backwards. 
 
5.1. Stage 3: Bargaining over input price and output 
decisions 
If FTA is reached in stage 2, the two domestic firms bargain over
T
N
P , taking 
1
Q
and
*
1
Q  as given. The following two sections evaluate the payoffs of the domestic 
final-good producer associated with its two procurement options. 
 
5.1.1. Outside option 
If the domestic final-good producer switches to buy input *S  from the foreign 
input supplier, it solves for 
 
T * T *
*1 1 S S
1 11
1
max
P (Q Q ) P (1 )P Q
Q
          
where
  
T *
S S sP min C ,C  is from (49), indicating that the standard input S is bought 
from the competitive market with lower marginal cost; 
*
*S
(1 )P  is from (50), 
referring to the domestic final-good producer’s marginal cost of the “modified” 
foreign input *S . 
Under Assumption 1, the foreign final-good producer still buys both inputs from 
the foreign competitive markets. It solves for 
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* T * T * *
*1 1 1 S 1* S
1
1
max
P (Q Q ) P P Q
Q
         
The Cournot FOCs: 
(51) 
T
T T *1 1
*1 S S
1
1 1
P ( )
Q P ( ) P (1 )P 0
Q Q
  
       
 
  
(52) 
* T
* T T *1 1
*1 1 S S* *
1 1
P ( )
Q P ( ) P P 0
Q Q
  
     
 
 
The Cournot SOCs and the stability condition: 
(53) 
2 T 2 T
1 1 1
2 2
1
1 1 1
P ( ) P ( )
Q 2 0
Q Q Q
     
  
  
 
 
2 * T 2 T
*1 1 1
1*2 *2 *
1 1 1
P ( ) P ( )
Q 2 0
Q Q Q
     
  
  
 
2 2 * 2 2 *
1 1 1 1
2 *2 * *
1 1 1
1 1 1
0
Q Q Q Q Q Q
       
 
   
 
The above conditions guarantee that the FOCs solve for a unique Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium  T * * T ** *1 S 1 SS SQ ( ,P ,P ),Q ( ,P ,P )  .  
Since 
*
1
1 1
1
P ( ) P ( )
Q Q
   

 
, subtracting (51) by (52) yields 
T
* *1
*1 S
1
1
P ( )
(Q Q ) P 0
Q
 
   

 
Substitute  *1 1Q ,Q into the above equation and rearrange to obtain  
(54) 
*
** *S
T1 1
1
1
1
P
Q Q Q
P ( )
Q

  
 


 
implying that at the equilibrium, the domestic final-good producer produces less than 
the foreign good producer since it has higher marginal cost. The magnitude of this 
difference in outputs increases in the modification cost  and **SP but decreases in the 
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marginal effect of output on the final-good price.  
Given  *1 1Q ,Q , the respective equilibrium payoffs for the two producers are 
 T * T * T ** *S 1 1 1 S 1S S1 (P , ,P ) max{0, P Q ( ) Q ( ) P (1 )P Q ( )}              
 * T * T * T * ** *1 S 1 1 1 S 1S S(P , ,P ) max{0, P Q ( ) Q ( ) P P Q ( )}            
Note that if   and
 
are sufficiently high, the domestic final-good producer’s 
outside option is nonbinding since 1 0  . 
It is well known that in a Cournot duopoly model, if one firm’s marginal cost goes 
up, ceteris paribus, its equilibrium output and payoff falls, and the other firm’s 
equilibrium output and payoff rises (Church and Ware, 1999) . Since  is part of the 
domestic final-good producer’s marginal cost, its equilibrium output and payoff are 
decreasing in  , but the equilibrium output and payoff of the foreign final-good 
producer are increasing in  ,i.e., 
(55) 
*
1 1
Q ( ) Q ( )
0, 0
   
 
 
 
(56) 
*
1 1
( ) ( )
0, 0
   
 
 
 
To sum up Section 5.1.1, denote T
1
 , *T
1
 and 
T
N
 as the respective ex-ante payoffs 
for the domestic and foreign final-good producers  as well as the domestic input 
supplier under free trade. If switching occurs, the respective payoffs are 
T
1 1    
*T *
1 1
    
T
N
k   , k 0  
 
*
*S
P
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5.1.2. Inside option 
If the domestic final-good producer still deals with the domestic input supplier, the 
two firms engage in Nash bargaining over 
N
P  that satisfies: 
(57)      T T * TN 1 1 S N N
N
1
1 1 N 11
P
P argmax P (Q Q ) P P Q P C (k) Q 0
 
        
where T T
1 S N
*
1 11P (Q Q ) P P Q      and  N N 1P C (k) Q  are the respective ex-post 
payoffs from bargaining under FTA negotiations for the domestic final-good producer 
and the domestic input supplier. 1 is the domestic final-good producer’s payoff from 
its outside option if it switches. The domestic input supplier still has zero outside 
option, since the foreign final-good producer never switches to it under Assumption 1.  
FOC for (57) solves for  
(58) T T T T
N N 1 S
* 1
1 N N1
1
P P (k,Q ,Q ) C (k) (1 ) P ( ) P C (k)
Q
 
        
 
 .
24
 
The domestic final-good producer chooses 1Q to solve for 
(59)  T T T1 S N 11
1
max
P ( ) P P Q
Q
      
subject to (58) T T T
N 1 S
1
N N
1
P C (k) (1 ) P ( ) P C (k)
Q
 
       
 
. 
Substitute (58) into (59) and solve for 
(60) 
  
 
T T
1 1 S 1
T T
1 S 1
N 11
1
N 1
max
P ( ) P C (k) Q
Q
P ( ) P C (k) Q (1 )
       
       
 
The foreign final-good producer chooses *
1
Q to solves for  
(61) 
* T T * *
*1 1 S 1* S
1
max
P ( ) P P Q
Q
        
                                                             
24 The derivation is analogous to that of (4), shown in A.1 in Appendix.  
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The Cournot FOCs for (60) and (61): 
(62) 
T
T T1 1
1 S
* T
* T T *1 1
*1 1 S S* *
1 1
1 N
1 1
P ( )
Q P ( ) P C (k) 0,
Q Q
P ( )
Q P ( ) P P 0
Q Q
  
     
 
  
     
 
 
The Cournot SOCs and stability conditions are the same as (53). 
The above conditions guarantee that the FOCs solve for a unique Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium outputs  T T * *T T ** *1 S 1 SS SQ (k,P ,P ),Q (k,P ,P ) . Note that  does not affect the 
equilibrium outputs once the domestic final-good producer chooses not to switch. 
Define
TR(k) as the optimal surplus from agreement under free trade 
(63) 
 
 
T T T
1 S 1 1
T T T
1 S 1 1
T
N
N
R(k) P ( ) P C (k) Q (k) 0
P ( ) P C (k) Q (k)
     
    
 
 
Proposition 5. Given that   and **SP , are sufficiently low so that the outside 
option is binding (
1
0 ),  
(i) the surplus under free trade ( )
TR k is increasing in k , **SP and   , but 
decreasing in T
S
P ;  
(ii) the marginal benefit from investment under free trade 1 T( )R'( k ) is 
independent of  . Thus,   does not affect the investment decision under 
FTA negotiations. 
 
Proof.  See A.4 in Appendix. 
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Intuition for (i) 
If   and
 
are sufficiently low so that the outside option is binding, the surplus 
under free trade is increasing in investment since the investment reduces cost across 
all output. The surplus under free trade is also increasing in **SP and  because the 
outside option of buying the foreign input *S decreases when 
*
*S
P or   rises.  
Intuition for (ii) 
Since the final good producer still uses the input N, not the “modified” input *S , if its 
outside option is nonbinding, the modification cost of   does not affect the marginal 
benefit from investment under free trade. Consequently, it does not affect the 
investment decisions under FTA negotiations, which depends on a weighted-average 
of the marginal benefit from investment under free trade and under autarky (expected 
marginal benefit from investment under FTA negotiations ). 
 
To sum up Section 5.1.2, if no switching occurs, the respective ex-ante payoffs of 
domestic and foreign final-good producers, and the domestic input supplier under 
FTA negotiations are 
  T T T T1 1 S 1 TN1 1 1P ( ) P C (k) Q (k) R(k)            
*T T T * *T
*1 1 S 1S
P ( ) P P Q (k)        
 T TN N 1
T
NP (k) C (k) Q (k) (1 )R(k) k     
 
 
*
*S
P
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5.1.3. Buying from domestic input supplier vs. buying 
from foreign input supplier 
Proposition 6. Let kˆ  be the threshold investment that satisfies   **SN
ˆC ( k ) (1 )P . 
Once the FTA is reached, (i) the domestic final-good producer remains dealing with 
the domestic input supplier if and only if ˆ  k k K . (ii) the domestic final-good 
producer switches to the foreign input supplier if and only if ˆk k .
 
 
Proof.  See A.5 in Appendix. 
 
The surplus under free trade TR(k) is monotonically increasing in investment, and 
TR(k) 0  at the threshold kˆ . If the domestic input supplier just invests the threshold 
level kˆ , then the domestic final-good producer’s inside option and outside option are 
equal, so the producer is indifferent between remaining and switching. It remains 
dealing with the domestic input supplier if the supplier invests an above-threshold 
investment as in (i). This high investment creates a nonnegative surplus under free 
trade and promotes trading between the two domestic firms. However, it switches to 
the foreign supplier if the domestic input supplier chooses a below-threshold 
investment as in (ii). This low investment creates a negative surplus under free trade, 
which prohibits trading between the two domestic firms.  
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5.2. Stage 2: FTA reached or not reached 
The FTA is reached with probability (0,1] . No decision making is required for 
any firms. 
 
5.3. Stage 1: Relationship-specific investment 
The domestic input supplier chooses investment level under FTA negotiations to 
maximise its probability-expected profit  
(64) T T
N N
N
k
max
E (k) (k) (1 ) (k)       , 
where
T
N
(k)  is the domestic input supplier’s payoff under free trade if FTA is reached, 
given investment level k; N(k) is its autarky payoff given the same investment. 
Since 
T
N
(k) depends on whether k  is above or below the threshold investment 
level kˆ :  
     k                            if ˆk k  
T
N
(k)   
 
T(1 )R(k) k                  if ˆk k , 
there are two cases with two possible payoffs for the domestic input supplier to 
compare: (i) ˆk k  and (ii) ˆk k .  
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5.3.1. Expected profit created by below-threshold 
investment 
Let the optimal investment in this case be Lk . The subscript L denotes “lower than 
threshold”. 
The profit maximisation problem is 
(65) 
   T TN N N
k
max
E (k) (k) (1 ) (k) k (1 ) (1 )R(k) k
(1 )(1 )R(k) k
              
    
 
FOC for (65): 
(66) 
T
N
dE (k)
(1 )(1 )R '(k) 1 0
dk

       
Denote 
T
LEMB (k) as the expected marginal benefit from investment under FTA 
negotiations given a below-threshold investment  
(67) T
LEMB (k) (1 )(1 )R '(k)    
SOC for (65): 
(68) 
T
N
2
2
d E (k)
R ''(k) 0
dk

   
The above conditions ensure that the FOC solves for a unique maximiser, which is 
assumed to be interior:  Lk 0,K . Lk  satisfies (66): 
(69) T L L
LEMB (k ) (1 )(1 )R '(k ) 1     
implying that the expected marginal benefit equals the marginal cost of investment at 
Lk  under FTA negotiations. 
Obviously, the solution to (69) is valid if and only if it not only satisfies its 
definition, 
L ˆk k , but also creates a nonnegative expected profit, T
N
LE (k ) 0  . 
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Existence of solution to (69) does not guarantee that the solution satisfies both 
conditions. 
 
5.3.2. Expected profit created by above-threshold 
investment 
For  0,1 , the rent maximisation problem is 
(70)  
T T
N N
N
k
T
T
max
E (k) (k) (1 ) (k)
(1 )R(k) k (1 ) (1 )R(k) k
(1 )(1 )R(k) (1 )R(k) k
      
            
         
 
FOC for (70): 
(71) 
T
N TdE (k) (1 )(1 )R '(k) (1 )R '(k) 1 0
dk

          
Denote 
T
HEMB (k) as the expected marginal benefit from investment under FTA 
negotiations given an above-threshold investment  
(72) 
T T
H
T
EMB (k) (1 )R '(k) (1 )(1 )R '(k)
(1 )R '(k) (1 ) R '(k) R '(k)
      
       
. 
SOC for (70): 
(73) 
T
N
2
T
2
d E (k)
(1 )R ''(k) R ''(k) 0
dk

       
(73) is equivalent in assuming
25
 
(74) 
TR ''(k) 0  
The above conditions ensure that the FOC solves for a unique maximiser, which is 
                                                             
25 Analogous to deriving
PT
R ''(k) 0  in (45). 
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assumed to be interior:  Hk 0,K . The subscript H denotes “higher than threshold”.
Hk  must satisfy (71): 
(75) 
T H H H T
HEMB (k ) (1 )(1 )R '(k ) (1 )R '(k ) 1      , 
implying that at 
Hk , the expected marginal benefit from investment equals the 
marginal cost of investment under FTA negotiations.  
Obviously, the solution to (75) is valid if and only if it not only satisfies its definition, 
H ˆk k , but also creates a nonnegative expected profit T
N
HE (k ) 0  .26 
In the following, we show that H Lk k by comparing (75) and (69). 
Rearrange(69) to get L
1
R '(k )
(1 )(1 )

  
.  
Rearrange (75) to get H H T
1
R '(k ) R '(k )
(1 )(1 ) 1

 
    
.  
Since HR '(k ) has an extra negative term
H TR '(k )
1


 
, we have H LR '(k ) R '(k ) . 
Since R ''(k) 0 , we get H Lk k as expected.  
 
5.3.3. Below-threshold investment vs. above-threshold 
investment 
Whether the domestic input supplier chooses 
Lk  or Hk  depends on which one is 
larger, 
T
N
LE (k ) or T
N
HE (k ) : 
                                                             
26 Existence of solution to (69) does not guarantee that the solution satisfies both conditions. 
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(76)  
   
T T
N N
H L
H H H T H L L
H T H L H L
E (k ) E (k )
(1 ) R(k ) R(k ) R(k ) k (1 )(1 )R(k ) k
(1 ) R(k ) (1 ) R(k ) R(k ) k k
  
                  
           
 
Firstly consider
T T
N N
H LE (k ) E (k )   , 
From (77), 
T T
N N
H LE (k ) E (k )    is equivalent to 
(77)  H T H L H L(1 ) R(k ) (1 ) R(k ) R(k ) k k          
That is, the additional cost exceeds the additional benefit from choosing
Hk . Then, the 
domestic input supplier chooses 
Lk and gets
T
N
LE (k ) .  
Note that what the domestic input supplier tries to maximise is the expected 
payoff. Therefore, although in stage 1, it knows that if the FTA is reached in stage 2, it 
will incur the negative rent 
T
N
L L(k ) k    for certain, it still chooses Lk as there is 
possibility that it can get
N
L L L(k ) (1 )R(k ) k 0      if the FTA is not reached.  
 
Secondly consider
T T
N N
H LE (k ) E (k )   , 
From (77), 
T T
N N
H LE (k ) E (k )   is equivalent to 
(78)  H T H L H L(1 ) R(k ) (1 ) R(k ) R(k ) k k          
That is, the additional benefit exceeds the additional cost from choosing
Hk . Then, it 
chooses 
Hk and gets
T
N
HE (k ) .  
 
5.4. Investment under FTA negotiations vs. investment 
under FTA negotiations 
Proposition 7. (i) the investment under FTA negotiations is no more than that 
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under partial FTA negotiations in two cases: (i.1) 
Hk is chosen but
'( ) '( )PT T PT PTR k R k ; (i.2) 
Lk  is chosen ;(ii) the investment under FTA 
negotiations is higher than that under partial FTA negotiations if Hk is chosen and
'( ) '( )PT T PT PTR k R k . (iii)The magnitude of the difference between the investments 
under FTA negotiations and under partial FTA negotiations depends on the 
probability of reaching the FTA, . (iv) Sufficiently high  is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for Hk  to be chosen. 
 
Proof. See A.6 in Appendix. 
 
Intuition for (i)and (ii) 
Denote the total effect of opening up the input market on the investment under partial 
free trade PTk as the “input substitution effect”. This is because the only difference 
between partial free trade and free trade is that if the domestic input S is more 
expensive than foreign input S; the domestic final-good producer can substitute 
cheaper foreign inputs for more expensive domestic inputs. 
There are two cases to consider since there are two investment options under FTA 
negotiations, 
Hk or
Lk . 
Case 1. 
Hk  is chosen 
The key is to examine this “input substitution effect” in this case is to analyse the 
difference between the marginal benefit from investment under free trade and that 
under partial free trade, given PTk : 
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(79) 
T *T T PT *PT PT
1 1 1 1 1 1
T PT
1 1
PT T PT PT
PT PT PT PT
PT PT PT
N
(1 )R '(k ) (1 )R '(k )
(1 ) P '( )Q '(k )Q (k ) P '( )Q '(k )Q (k )
(1 )( C '(k )) Q (k ) Q (k )
   
        
     
 
This is because if PT T PT PTR '(k ) R '(k ) , PTk  is more valuable under free trade 
relative to partial free trade. Ceteris paribus, the domestic input supplier invests more 
under FTA negotiations relative to partial FTA negotiations, 
H PTk k . Analogously, 
if PT T PT PTR '(k ) R '(k ) , it invests less, H PTk k . So the “input substitution effect” is 
positive if PT T PT PTR '(k ) R '(k ) and negative if PT T PT PTR '(k ) R '(k ) . 
The effect of opening up the input market on the marginal benefit from investment 
under autarky as given by (79) can also be decomposed into two effects: a “strategic 
effect” and a “cost effect” of opening up free trade.  
The “strategic effect” is represented by the first term 
T *T T PT *PT PT
1 1 1 1 1 1
PT PT PT PT(1 ) P '( )Q '(k )Q (k ) P '( )Q '(k )Q (k )      . 
Unlike the “strategic effect” of the “output competitive effect” which is always 
positive, the sign of this “strategic effect” of the “input substitution effect” is 
ambiguous. Applying the explanation on page 40, additional investment at PTk 27 has a 
direct positive effect on the partial-trade price through reducing the foreign 
final-good producer’s partial-trade output. Higher partial-trade price raises 
partial-trade revenue across partial-trade output of the domestic final-good producer. 
However, under free trade, additional investment at PTk  also has a direct positive 
effect on the free-trade price which raises free-trade revenue across free-trade output 
of the domestic final-good producer. Since given PTk , the domestic final-good 
                                                             
27 The explanation on page 40 not only applies to 
A
k , but also applies to any k. 
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producer’s partial-trade output PT
1
PTQ (k ) and free-trade output T
1
PTQ (k ) may be 
different, the abilities of additional investment in raising the partial-trade price 
T *T
1 1
PTP '( )Q '(k ) and free-trade price PT *PT
1 1
PTP '( )Q '(k )  may be different, as it depends 
on the characteristics of the input N’s cost function and the characteristics of the 
final-good demand function . The above differences in outputs and impact on prices 
may cause the “strategic effect” of “input substitution effect” on PTk to be positive, 
negative or zero.  
The “cost effect” is given by the second term 
 T PT
1 1
PT PT PT
N(1 )( C '(k )) Q (k ) Q (k )     .  
The analysis of the “cost effect” of opening up free trade is similar to that of opening 
up partial free trade. The strength of the “cost effect” of opening up free trade is the 
absolute value of the second term 
T PT
1 1
PT PT PT
N(1 )( C '(k )) Q (k ) Q (k )    
Firstly, the “cost effect” puts upward pressure on PTk  if T PT
1 1
PT PTQ (k ) Q (k ) . This is 
because additional unit of investment is more valuable as it reduces the marginal cost 
of input N across higher output under partial free trade. Secondly, the “cost effect” 
puts downward pressure on PTk if T PT
1 1
PT PTQ (k ) Q (k ) .  
From (80), the “input substitution effect” on PTk is a summation of the “strategic 
effect” and “cost effect”. The “input substitution effect” is ambiguous as it depends on 
whether the two effects work in the same direction or not. If not, it depends on which 
effect dominates. 
Case 2. 
Lk  is chosen 
 63 
 
Lk is lower than PTk  for certain. This is because the domestic final-good producer 
still deals with the domestic input supplier once the partial FTA is reached. Given PTk , 
the domestic input supplier still gets positive profit PT PT PT(1 )R '(k ) k  . But once 
the FTA is reached, given
Lk , the domestic final-good producer switches. So the 
domestic input supplier gets negative profit
Lk . Since the probabilities of reaching 
the partial FTA and FTA are the same, 
L PTk k , i.e., this example has a negative 
“input substitution effect” . 
Intuition for (iii) 
Te intuition for (iii) is analogous to that for Proposition 4 (iii). 
Intuition for (iv) 
Consider the extreme case where the modification cost  is close to zero. Then the 
domestic final-good producer’s outside option is to buy the foreign input *S at a price 
close to **SP . Under Assumption 1, the lowest price for input N is still higher than the 
foreign input
*S
*
*SN
min P (k) P . The domestic final-good producer switches to its 
outside option once the FTA is reached. So it is optimal to choose Lk , implying that no 
valid Hk exists. In other words, Hk is chosen implies that  is sufficiently high. 
However, high  does not implies that Hk is always chosen. Consider the other 
extreme case where the modification cost is infinity. Then the domestic final-good 
producer’s outside option is nonbinding. Even if the FTA is reached, it still does not 
switch. A valid Hk may exists. From (77)
  
   
T T
N N
H L
H T H L H L
E (k ) E (k )
(1 ) R(k ) (1 ) R(k ) R(k ) k k
  
          
, 
whether the valid Hk is chosen over the valid Lk further depends on its bargaining 
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power1 , the probability of reaching the FTA  , and the characteristics (e.g. 
curvature) of the NC (k)  function and the final-good demand functions. For example, 
when 1  , even if  , it is still possible for T T
N N
H LE (k , ) E (k )    and Lk to 
be chosen. 
 Overall, the modification cost serves as a “protector” for the domestic input 
supplier against the competition from cheaper foreign substitute (as if it makes the 
foreign substitute more expensive). Higher modification cost is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for above-threshold investment to be chosen. 
 
Lemma 1. If the demand functions in the two countries are linear, (i) the investment 
under FTA negotiations is no more than that under partial FTA negotiations if 
*S SP P ;(ii) the investment under FTA negotiations is higher than that under partial 
FTA negotiations if 
Hk  is chosen and *S SP P . 
 
Proof. See A.7 in Appendix. 
 
For linear demand functions, the term PT *PT
1 1
PTP '( )Q '(k ) is constant. So the sign of 
the “input substitution effect” solely depends on the difference in outputs under free 
trade and partial free trade, given PTk : 
T *T T PT
1 1 1 1
PT T PT PT
PT PT PT PT
N
(1 )R '(k ) (1 )R '(k )
(1 )P '( )Q '(k )( C '(k )) Q (k ) Q (k )
  
      
 
The difference in outputs only comes from the change in costs. Once the input market 
opens, if 
*
S SP P , the foreign final-good producer now benefits by getting cheaper 
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domestic input S. So the domestic final-good producer’s output falls under free trade 
relative to partial free trade. So H PTk < k . Since L PTk < k also holds for linear demand 
function, 
*
S SP P serves as the condition for the underinvestment relative to
PTk . 
Analogously, if 
*
S SP P , 
H PTk k . 
 
 Example for Proposition 7 and Lemma 1 
This example uses the same functions and parameters as previous examples, and the 
following additional function and parameter: 
the demand function for good 1 in Foreign: * 11Q a bP    
the modification cost of foreign input *S : 
= 2.5 . 
The below-threshold investment under FTA negotiations is
Lk 7.11 , which is less 
than the investment under partial FTA negotiations 
 
L PTk 57 0k 8.   
The above-threshold investment under FTA negotiations is
Hk 21.00 , which is 
higher than the investment under partial FTA negotiations 
H PTk k 5.31 0    
The expected profit from the above-threshold investment is higher than that from the 
below-threshold investment 
T T
N N
H LE (k ) E ( 10.8) 5 0k     
Thus, 
Hk is chosen. 
As predicted by Proposition 4 (iv), Hk  is chosen implies that   is sufficiently high. 
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In this example, 2.5   is sufficiently high, as it requires 2.5 units of foreign input 
*S as per-unit modification cost.  
The marginal benefit from investment under free trade is higher relative to partial free 
trade T PT PT PT(1 ) R '(k ) (1 ) R '(k )   because  
T PT PT PTR '(k ) R1 '(k.67 . 3) 1 2   
Since Hk is chosen and T PT PT PTR '(k ) R '(k ) , so this example has the same conditions 
as in Proposition 7 (ii), as predicted, the above-threshold investment under FTA 
negotiations is higher than the investment under partial FTA negotiations 
H PTk k  
In addition, this example also verifies Lemma 1. Firstly, the final-good demand 
functions in the two countries are linear. Secondly, the standardized input S produced 
domestically is more expensive that that produced in Foreign: 
*
S SP 10 P 8    
So the domestic final-good producer benefits by getting cheaper foreign input
*S . The 
domestic final-good producer’s output rises under free trade relative to partial free 
trade, given PTk . Thus, the “input substitution effect” is positive, whose sign solely 
depends on the difference in the above outputs. As predicted by Lemma 1, 
 H PTk k . 
 
5.5. Summary 
In stage 1, the domestic input supplier chooses investment level. 
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In stage 2, all firms know whether FTA is reached or not. 
In stage 3, the final-good producer makes input procurement decision. 
There are four cases to consider: 
Case 1: Lk  is chosen and FTA is reached 
Since
L TR(k ) 0  , L T1 1R(k )    . The domestic final-good producer can access 
to its binding outside option and switches to the foreign input supplier. The respective 
rents for the domestic and foreign final-good producers and the domestic input 
supplier under free trade are 
T
1 1    
T* *
1 1    
T
N
Lk    
Case 2: 
Lk  is chosen and FTA is not reached 
The two domestic firms remain trading. The respective payoffs are 
L
1 R(k )    
* *
1 1    
N
L L(1 )R(k ) k     
Case 3: 
Hk  is chosen and FTA is reached 
Since
H TR(k ) 0  ,
H T
1 1R(k )    . Although the domestic final-good producer 
can access to its outside option, since its outside option is nonbinding, it cannot 
switch. The respective payoffs are 
T
1
H TR(k )  
 
T T* * H
1 1 (k )    
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T
N
H T H(1 )R(k ) k     
Case 4: Hk  is chosen and FTA is not reached 
The two domestic firms remain trading. The respective payoffs are 
1
HR(k )  
 
*
1  
N
H H(1 )R(k ) k     
 
5.6. Investment under FTA negotiations vs. investment under 
autarky 
Proposition 8. (i) The total effect of FTA negotiations on the investment under 
autarky is a combination of the “output competitive effect” and the “input 
substitution effect”. (ii) The magnitude of the difference between the above two 
investments depends on the probability of reaching the FTA, .  
 
Proof. See A.8 in Appendix. 
 
Since under free trade, there are both free trade in the final-good market and input 
market, the effect of opening up free trade on the optimal investment under autarky 
Ak can be decomposed into the “output competitive effect” of opening up final-good 
market, and the “input substitution effect” of opening up the input market. Thus, when 
there is probability of reaching a FTA, whether the investment is above or below Ak
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is a combination of the two effects. The magnitude of the difference between 
investment under FTA negotiations and Ak depends on the probability of reaching the 
FTA, .   
It is notable that there are more cases in which a further underinvestment under 
FTA negotiations relative to under autarky is observed. This is because of Assumption 
1, which assumes that the production of foreign input *S is always more efficient that 
of input N, even with the domestic input N supplier undertake the highest investment.  
 
 Example for Proposition 8 
Using the same functions and parameters as previous examples, the following 
figure is plotted, which summarises the derivation of different investments. The 
horizontal axis measures the relationship-specific investment k. The vertical axis 
measures the marginal benefit and marginal cost of investment. 
 
Figure 3 
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The marginal benefit from investment under autarky is  
AMB (1 )R '(k)   
The expected marginal benefit from investment under partial FTA negotiations is  
PT PTEMB (1 )R '(k) R '(k) R '(k)        
The expected marginal benefit from investment under FTA negotiations given the 
above-threshold and below-threshold investment are 
T T
HEMB (1 )R '(k) R '(k) R '(k)        
T
LEMB (1 )(1 )R '(k)     
respectively. 
Ak , PTk , Hk and Lk are the investment levels given by the intersections of the above 
four curves with the marginal cost of investment curve MC 1 respectively. Then the 
domestic input supplier’s profit or expected profit is maximised in each case. 
In this example, Hk is chosen. From Figure 3 
PT H Ak k k  , 
which implies that the negative “output competitive effect” which causes PT Ak k
outweighs the positive “input substitution effect” which causes PT Hk k  in this 
example. Overall, the presence of FTA negotiations aggravates the domestic HUP. 
 
6. Results 
This paper demonstrates that it is possible for the domestic hold-up problem to be 
either aggravated or alleviated in the presence of FTA negotiations. The magnitude of 
aggravation or alleviation is intensified by the probability of reaching the FTA. Since 
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the FTA open up both the final-good and the input markets, whether aggravation or 
alleviation occurs depends on the combination of the “output competitive effect” 
resulted from free trade in the final-good market, and the “input substitution effect” 
resulted from free trade in the input market. Both the “output competitive effect” and 
the “input substitution effect” can be further decomposed into a “strategic effect” and a 
“cost effect”. The “strategic effect” comes from the change in the impact of additional 
investment on the final-good total revenue through the investment’s direct effect on the 
final-good price. The “cost effect” comes from the change in the impact of additional 
investment on the final-good total cost through the change in final-good output. There 
are three fundamental driving forces behind the “strategic effect” and the “cost effect”: 
(1) the characteristics of the cost function for the non-standardised input; (2) the 
characteristics of final-good’s demand function; (3) the relative efficiency of the two 
final-good producers in the two countries. The modification cost of the foreign input 
serves as a “protector” for the domestic input supplier. In this model, higher 
relationship-specific investment is more likely to be undertaken by the domestic input 
supplier only if the modification cost is sufficiently high.  
 
7. Conclusion  
This study originally presents a formal model which identifies the impact of 
potential free trade on the underinvestment resulting from the domestic HUP. It also 
explores the driving forces behind the impacts. Consequently, from the theoretical 
perspective, this model constitutes an attempt for formal demonstration of the 
productive efficiency gains or losses resulting from potential free trade (Wes, 2000). It 
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serves as one example showing that free trade is a “double-edged sword” and it may 
or may not increase efficiency.  
The immediate policy implication from this study is to provide more accurate 
welfare assessment, especially for the FTA negotiators and the competition policy 
makers. Firstly, consider the implication for the FTA negotiators. If the presence of 
FTA negotiations causes aggravation of the domestic HUP, the negotiators need to 
assess this welfare loss against the possible welfare gains arising from the domestic 
final-good producer’s access of cheaper foreign inputs. Gradual rather than radical 
trade liberalization in the input market may be one option. Secondly, consider the 
implication for the competition policy makers. If the presence of FTA negotiations 
causes severe aggravation of the domestic HUP, this may become justification for 
vertical integration
28
 (Williamson, 1975, Klein et al., 1978). The competition policy 
makers also need to assess welfare changes carefully before allowing the two 
domestic firms to merge.  
In order to focus on the fundamental driving forces behind the impact of FTA 
negotiations on the domestic HUP, this paper involves simplifying approaches and 
assumptions when constructing models. The main limitations of this paper lie in those 
simplifications. Firstly, it adopts a partial equilibrium approach and does not take into 
account the difference between countries in factor endowments and shift in consumer 
demand for the final-good. Secondly, it only allows the RSI to be undertaken by one 
firm in one country, and the two countries are of equal size. Future work can extend this 
                                                             
28 For instance, if the FTA negotiations are expected to be considerably time-consuming, the domestic final-good 
producer may prefer merging as it takes into account of the cost of waiting for accessing cheaper foreign inputs when 
calculating its expected payoff. The domestic input supplier may also prefer merging if its expected payoff under 
non-vertical integration is less than that under vertical integration, in the presence of FTA negotiations. 
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model by examining the issue in a more complex setting of two-sided RSI
29
 in each 
country and there are multiple countries with different market sizes. Thirdly, it rules out 
the possibility for the foreign final-good producer to procure inputs from the domestic 
non-standardised input supplier. If this is allowed, the model is expected to yield more 
interesting results as the domestic input supplier no longer has zero outside option. The 
results are likely to depend on the relative sizes of outside options for the two domestic 
firms. Fourthly, the probability of reaching the FTA is assumed to be common 
knowledge among all parties. One possible extension is to introduce information 
asymmetry among firms regarding this probability. Fifthly, current analysis restricts 
attention to ex-ante investment incentives by assuming that the ex-post bargaining is 
always efficient. Following the recent development in theories of the firm
30
, future 
applications can loosen this assumption and explore the organization forms in a more 
comprehensive way. Last but not least, the results derived in this paper are subject to 
future empirical tests.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
29 Both the final-good producer and the input supplier undertake RSI. 
30 See page 10. 
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Appendix 
A.1 Derivation of the autarky-price for input N  
     
   
N
N
1
N 1 1 s N 1 N N 1
P
1
1 1 s N N N 1
P
P arg max P (Q ) P P Q 0 P C (k) Q 0
arg max P (Q ) P P P C (k) Q
 
 
     
   
 
FOC: 
   
   
   
1
1 1 s N N N 1 1 1
1 1 s N N N 1
N
1 1 s N N N 1
d P (Q ) P P P C (k) Q
P (Q ) P P P C (k) Q
dP
(1 ) P (Q ) P P P C (k) Q 0
 
 
 
  
     
    
   N N 1 1 s NP C (k) (1 ) P (Q ) P P 0        
1 1 s N
N N
P (Q ) P P
P C (k) 1
  

 
 
 N N 1 1 S NP C (k) (1 ) P (Q ) P C (k)      
SOC: 
   
   
   
   
   
1 1
1 1 s N N N 1
1 1 s N N N 1
N
2 1
1 1 s N N N 1
1
1
1 1 s N N N
1
1 1 s N N N
1
1 1
P (Q ) P P P C (k) Q
d
(1 ) P (Q ) P P P C (k) Q
dP
( 1) P (Q ) P P P C (k) Q
Q
(1 ) P (Q ) P P P C (k)
P (Q ) P P P C (k)
(1 )Q
P (Q ) P
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
       
       
   
       
   
  
    
     
     
     
1
s N N N
2
1 1 1 s N N N N N 1 1 s N
1 1
1 1 1 s N N N N N 1 1 s N
2 1
1 1 1 s N N N 1 1 s N
P P C (k)
Q (1 ) P (Q ) P P P C (k) P C (k) P (Q ) P P
(1 )Q P (Q ) P P P C (k) P C (k) P (Q ) P P
(1 )Q P (Q ) P P P C (k) P (Q ) P C (k) 0
 
 
 
 
  
 
   
          
         
         
 
Non-positive SOC guarantees that the solution 
 N N 1 1 S NP C (k) (1 ) P (Q ) P C (k)      is a maximiser. 
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 3 
Rearranging (37) yields 
 
 PTPT 1
1 S PT
1
N
P
P P C (k)
Q
 
    

, substitute this equation into PTR '(k) yields  
(80)
  
    
  
 
PT PT
1 S 1
PT PT *PT PT PT PT
1 1 1 1 1 S 1
PT PT *PT PT PT PT PT
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
PT *PT PT
1 1 1
1
N
PT
N N
N
N
d P ( ) P C (k) Q (k)
R '(k)
dk
P '( ) Q '(k) Q '(k) C '(k) Q (k) P ( ) P C (k) Q '(k)
P '( ) Q '(k) Q '(k) C '(k) Q (k) P '( )Q (k)Q '(k)
P '( )Q '(k) C '(k) Q (k)
P
  

       
     
  
 PT *PT PT PT
1 1 1
N'( )Q '(k)Q (k) C '(k)Q (k) 0  
  
where the last inequality is because PT
1
P '( ) 0   ,
 
*PT *PT PT PT
1 1 1 1
Q '(k) Q '(Q )Q '(k) 0   and 
NC '(k) 0  . 
Q.E.D. 
 
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4 
(i) and (ii) 
From (17), R ''(k) 0  and (45), PTR ''(k) 0 , the expected marginal benefit from 
investment under partial FTA negotiations is decreasing in k, 
(81) PT PTEMB ''(k) (1 )R ''(k) (1 ) R ''(k) R ''(k) 0           
Therefore, to compare PTk and Ak , we only need to compare the expected marginal 
benefit from investment under partial FTA negotiations given PTk and Ak : 
PT PTEMB '(k ) and PT AEMB '(k ) . 
The marginal benefit from investment under partial free trade given Ak is 
PT *PT PT
1 1 1
PT A A A A PT A
N(1 )R '(k ) (1 )[P '( )Q '(k )Q (k ) C '(k )Q (k )]            
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Case 1. PT
1 1
A AQ (k ) Q (k )  
The marginal benefit under partial free trade given Ak  is higher relative to autarky: 
 PT *PT PT PT1 1 1 1 1
PT A A
A A A A A
N
(1 ) R '(k ) R '(k )
(1 )P '( )Q '(k )Q (k ) (1 ) C '(k ) Q (k ) Q (k ) 0
    
           
 
So the expected marginal benefit from investment under partial FTA negotiations 
given Ak exceeds the marginal benefit from investment under autarky, which equals 
to the marginal cost of investment: 
PT A A PT A A A AEMB '(k ) (1 )R '(k ) (1 ) R '(k ) R '(k ) MB (k ) 1         
 
From (46), the expected marginal benefit from investment under partial FTA 
negotiations given PTk  equals to marginal cost of investment: 
PT PTEMB '(k ) 1
 
Therefore,  
(82) PT A PT PTEMB '(k ) EMB '(k ) 1 
 
From (81), PTEMB ''(k) 0 , 
we have 
PT Ak k  
Case 2. PT
1 1
A AQ (k ) Q (k ) and 
PT *PT PT PT
1 1 1 1 1
A A A A A
NP '( )Q '(k )Q (k ) C '(k ) Q (k ) Q (k )     
The marginal benefit under partial free trade given Ak  is higher relative to autarky: 
 PT *PT PT PT1 1 1 1 1
PT A A
A A A A A
N
(1 ) R '(k ) R '(k )
(1 )P '( )Q '(k )Q (k ) (1 ) C '(k ) Q (k ) Q (k ) 0
    
           
 
Following the same reasoning in case 1,  
PT Ak k . 
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Case 3. PT
1 1
A AQ (k ) Q (k ) and 
PT *PT PT PT
1 1 1 1 1
A A A A A
NP '( )Q '(k )Q (k ) C '(k ) Q (k ) Q (k )     
The marginal benefit under partial free trade given Ak  is lower relative to autarky: 
 PT *PT PT PT1 1 1 1 1
PT A A
A A A A A
N
(1 ) R '(k ) R '(k )
(1 )P '( )Q '(k )Q (k ) (1 ) C '(k ) Q (k ) Q (k ) 0
    
           
 
Following the reasoning in case 1, but in the opposite direction, we get 
PT Ak k . 
 (iii) From (71), the difference between 
Ak and PTk is increasing in the difference between 
the expected marginal benefits from investment under partial FTA, given
Ak and PTk : 
(83)
PT A
A A PT A
d k k
0
d (1 )R '(k ) (1 ) R '(k ) R '(k ) 1


        
  
Partially differentiate the denominator of (83) with respect to the probability of 
reaching the partial FTA, , 
(84)
A PT A A
PT A A
(1 )R '(k ) (1 ) R '(k ) R '(k ) 1
(1 ) R '(k ) R '(k ) 0
         
   

 
From (83) and (84),  
PT Ak k
0
 


 
implying that the magnitude of difference in PTk  and Ak  is increasing in the 
probability of reaching the partial FTA. 
Q.E.D. 
 
A.4 Proof of Proposition 5 
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(i) Analogous to the proof of Proposition 3 (i),  
(85)  T *T T1 1 1
T
NR '(k) P '( )Q '(k) C '(k) Q (k) 0   
 
Since the outside option is binding
1
0  , partially differentiate
TR (k) with respect to
 , 
(86) *1 1 * 1S
1
T TR (k) R (k)
( P Q ) 0
   
      
   
 
Similarly, partially differentiate
TR(k) with respect to **SP , 
(87) 1 1
* * *
* * *1S S S
T TR (k) R (k)
0
P P P
   
   
   
 
(ii) Since the final good producer still uses the input N, not the “modified” input *S if 
its outside option is nonbinding, the modification cost of   does not affect the 
marginal benefit from investment under free trade, using (85), 
(88)
   T *T T1 1 1
T
N(1 )R '(k) P '( )Q '(k) C '(k) Q (k)
(1 ) 0
    
   
 
  
From (69) 
T L L
LEMB (k ) (1 )(1 )R '(k ) 1     
and (75) T H T HHEMB (k ) (1 )R '(k) (1 ) R '(k ) R '(k) 1         , 
Together with (88), 
Neither the level of Lk or Hk is affected by  . 
                                                          
Q.E.D. 
 
A.5 Proof of Proposition 6 
Note that the only difference between the Cournot FOCs (51) (52) for outside option 
and the Cournot FOCs (62) for inside option is the marginal cost of the 
non-standardised input. If there is no such difference, i.e., 
*
*S
N
ˆC (k) (1 )P   , the 
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FOCs (51) (52) and the FOCs (62) yield the same Cournot equilibrium outputs:
1 1
ˆQ (k) Q and * *
1 1
ˆQ (k) Q . Thus, 
(89) 
T T
1 S 1 1
T T T T *
*1 S 1 1 S 1S
T
N
N
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆR (k) P (k) P C (k) Q (k)
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆP (k) P C (k) Q (k) P (k) P (1 )P Q 0
    
 
           
   
 
There are two cases: 
(i) ˆK k k   
NC (k) is monotonically decreasing in k. Therefore, as long as k is above kˆ ,
*
*S
N N
ˆC (k) C (k) (1 )P    . 
Since from (85),
TR '(k) 0 , we get  
T T ˆR (k) R (k) 0   
As 0  , T1 1R (k)    .  
The domestic final-good producer remains dealing with the domestic input supplier 
after trade opens to get higher payoff 
T
1 R (k)  . When
TR (k) 0  , we assume 
that the domestic final-good producer still deal with the domestic input supplier as 
there is no incentive for it to switch. 
(ii) 
ˆk k  
As long as k is below kˆ ,
*
*S
N N
ˆ(1 )P C (k) C (k)    . Since TR '(k) 0 , we get
 
T T ˆR (k) R (k) 0 
 
. 
As 0  , 
T
1 1R (k)    .  
The domestic final-good producer switches to foreign supplier of *S  to get higher 
payoff 1 .                                                     
  Q.E.D. 
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A.6 Proof of Proposition 7 
(i) and (ii) 
From (17), R ''(k) 0 and (74), TR ''(k) 0 , the expected marginal benefit from 
investment under FTA negotiations is decreasing in k, 
(90) T THEMB ''(k) (1 )R ''(k) (1 ) R ''(k) R ''(k) 0           
Case 1. Hk is chosen 
Both the expected marginal benefit from investment under free trade given Hk and that 
under partial free trade given PTk equal to the marginal cost of investment: 
(91) 
T H PT PT
HEMB (k ) EMB (k ) 1   
Case 1.1. 
If T PT PT PTR '(k ) R '(k ) , 
the expected marginal benefit from investment under free trade is higher relative to 
partial free trade, given PTk : 
(92)
T PT PT PT
HEMB (k ) EMB (k ) 1  . 
Following the inequality sign in (90) and (91) yield 
T PT T H
H HEMB (k ) EMB (k )  
Since
T
HEMB ''(k) 0 ,  
H PTk k . 
Case 1.2. 
Analogously, If, T PT PT PTR '(k ) R '(k ) , 
H PTk k . 
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Case 2. Lk is chosen 
Since 
PT PT LEMB (k ) (1 )(1 )R '(k ) 1    , 
Rearrangement yields 
L PT PT PTR '(k ) R '(k ) R '(k ) 0
1

  
 
 
since R ''(k) 0 , 0
1


 
,  
L PTk k . 
(iii) Analogous to the proof of Proposition 4 (iii). 
(iv) From (76)  
   T TN NH L T H H L H LE (k , ) E (k ) (1 ) R (k , ) (1 ) R(k ) R(k ) k k              
 
from (86),
TR(k)
0



,
 
(93) 
T T
N N
H L T HE (k , ) E (k ) R (k )
(1 ) 0
           
  .
 
Since from (63) 
 
 
 
T T T
1 S 1 1
T T T T T *
*1 S 1 1 S 1S
T
N
N
R (k) P ( ) P C (k) Q (k)
P ( ) P C (k) Q (k) P ( ) P (1 )P Q ( )
    
              
and from Assumption 1 
*
*S
N NC (k) C (K) P  , 
for sufficiently small modification cost 0 ,  
TR (k) 0 , 
 i.e., valid Hk does not exist, only Lk can be chosen.  
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From (92), Hk is more likely to be chosen when  rises.  
Thus, Hk is chosen implies that  is sufficiently high.  
However, from (76), high  does not implies that Hk is always chosen. Whether 
Hk or Lk to be chosen further depends on  ,  , and the characteristics (e.g. 
curvature) of the NC (k)  function and the final-good demand functions. For example, 
when 1  , even if  , so 
1
0  and a valid Hk  exist, it is still possible for
T T
N N
H LE (k , ) E (k ) 0     and Lk to be chosen.
 Q.E.D. 
 
A.7 Proof of Lemma 1 
Case 1 
For linear demand functions, PT *PT
1 1
PTP '( )Q '(k ) is constant.  
T *T T PT
1 1 1 1
T PT PT PT
PT PT PT PT
N
(1 )R '(k ) (1 )R '(k )
(1 )P '( )Q '(k )( C '(k )) Q (k ) Q (k )
  
      
 
If 
*
S SP P ,
T PT
1 1
PT PTQ (k ) Q (k ) , then 
T PT PT PT(1 )R '(k ) (1 )R '(k )   . 
Following the proof in case 1.1 Proposition 7, 
H PTk k . 
Analogously, If 
*
S SP P ,
T PT
1 1
PT PTQ (k ) Q (k ) , then 
T PT PT PT(1 )R '(k ) (1 )R '(k )   . 
Following the proof in case 1.2 Proposition 7, 
H PTk k . 
Case 2 
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Same as Case 2 in Proposition 7.  
Q.E.D. 
 
A.8 Proof of Proposition 8 
(i)  
Combination of the findings of Proposition 4 and Proposition 7 yields the following 
cases: 
Case 1.1 PT
1 1
A AQ (k ) Q (k ) , PT *PT PT PT
1 1 1 1 1
A A A A A
NP '( )Q '(k )Q (k ) C '(k ) Q (k ) Q (k )    ,
Lk  
is chosen 
L PT Ak k k   
Case1.2 PT
1 1
A AQ (k ) Q (k ) , PT *PT PT PT
1 1 1 1 1
A A A A A
NP '( )Q '(k )Q (k ) C '(k ) Q (k ) Q (k )    , 
Hk is chosen but T PT PT PTR '(k ) R '(k )  
H PT Ak k k   
Case1.3
PT
1 1
A AQ (k ) Q (k ) , PT *PT PT PT
1 1 1 1 1
A A A A A
NP '( )Q '(k )Q (k ) C '(k ) Q (k ) Q (k )    , 
Hk is chosen and T PT PT PTR '(k ) R '(k )  
Case1.3.1 “output competitive effect” outweighs “input substitution effect” 
PT H Ak k k    
Case1.3.2 “input substitution effect” outweighs “output competitive effect” 
A PT Hk k k   
Case 2.1
PT
1 1
A AQ (k ) Q (k ) ,
Lk  is chosen 
L A PTk k k   
Case 2.2
PT
1 1
A AQ (k ) Q (k ) , Hk is chosen but T PT PT PTR '(k ) R '(k )  
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Case2.2.1 “output competitive effect” outweighs “input substitution effect” 
A H PTk k k   
Case2.2.2 “input substitution effect” outweighs “output competitive effect” 
H A PTk k k   
Case 2.3 PT
1 1
A AQ (k ) Q (k ) , Hk is chosen and T PT PT PTR '(k ) R '(k )  
A PT Hk k k   
Case3.1 PT
1 1
A AQ (k ) Q (k ) , PT *PT PT PT
1 1 1 1 1
A A A A A
NP '( )Q '(k )Q (k ) C '(k ) Q (k ) Q (k )    , 
Lk  is chosen 
L A PTk k k   
Case3.2 PT
1 1
A AQ (k ) Q (k ) , PT *PT PT PT
1 1 1 1 1
A A A A A
NP '( )Q '(k )Q (k ) C '(k ) Q (k ) Q (k )    , 
Hk is chosen but T PT PT PTR '(k ) R '(k )  
Case3.2.1 “output competitive effect” outweighs “input substitution effect” 
A H PTk k k   
Case3.2.1 “input substitution effect” outweighs “output competitive effect” 
H A PTk k k   
Case 3.3 PT
1 1
A AQ (k ) Q (k ) , PT *PT PT PT
1 1 1 1 1
A A A A A
NP '( )Q '(k )Q (k ) C '(k ) Q (k ) Q (k )    , 
Hk is chosen and T PT PT PTR '(k ) R '(k )  
A PT Hk k k   
(ii) 
Analogous to the proof of Proposition 4(iii). 
Q.E.D. 
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